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This article examines the impact of the UNESCO
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural
Heritage on admiralty law, particularly the law of
treasure salvage as applied to shipwrecks in
international waters. Despite its many proponents, the
Convention has numerous detractors who believe that if
it enters into force, it will nullify treasure salvage, a
prosperous industry in many areas of the world.
Although much tension exists between salvage and the
preservation of the underwater cultural heritage as
proposed by the Convention, the author concludes that
the two are not completely incompatible with one
another. Rather, salvors and cultural heritage experts
can and should work together to protect the world's
historic shipwrecks.
Cet article examine les effets que la Convention de
l'UNESCO sur la protection du patrimoine culturel
subaquatique exerce sur la Loi d'amirauti, plus
pr6cis6ment sur la loi relative au sauvetage des tr~sors
lorsqu'elle s'applique aux 6paves dans les eaux
internationales. Malgr ses nombreux promoteurs, la
Convention compte aussi de nombreux d~tracteurs qui
estiment que son entr6e en vigueur rendra inutile le
sauvetage de tr~sors, industrie prospire dans plusieurs
parties du monde. Malgr6 la grande tension entre le
sauvetage et la prdservation du patrimoine
subaquatique, comme la Convention le suggire, I'auteure
conclut que ces deux mani res d'aborder le probl~me ne
sont pas enti~rement incompatibles. Les sauveteurs et
les experts du patrimoine culturel pourraient et
devraient plut6t coop6rer pour prot~ger les 6paves
historiques dans le monde.
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A ship is the most living of inanimate things.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The law that governs the ownership and disposition of historic
shipwrecks found in international waters remains uncertain. Until recently,
jurisdiction over title to discovered shipwrecks was not problematic, since
international law has clearly recognized the sovereignty of the coastal state
within its territorial waters. But with the advent of technology that makes
salvage possible in the deepest waters,3 it is necessary to adapt maritime law
to deal with international disputes over wrecks.
Admiralty and property law, in the form of salvage law and the law
of finds respectively, have been applied to settle disputes over shipwrecks
and their cargoes for hundreds of years.' Under traditional salvage law and
the law of finds, however, thousands of wreck sites have been plundered
and destroyed. From a prehistoric canoe 5 to the R.M.S. Titanic,6 finders
I Oliver Wendell Holmes, Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1881) at 26.
2 "International waters" are those beyond the territorial seas of states. See Patrick J. O'Keefe,
"International Waters" in Sarah Dromgoode, ed., Legal Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage:
National and International Perspectives (London: Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 223 for this
definition. "Territorial waters" refers to those waters over which a state exercises jurisdiction and
control, i.e. internal waters, archipelagic waters (of an archipelagic state) and territorial sea. For a
summary of these maritime zones, see infra note 102 and accompanying text.
3 Technical advances include better deep-diving robots and manned submersibles, precise systems
of magnetic and acoustic sensing and mapping, highly accurate positioning systems, and improved
navigation and hydrographic software. This technology is capable of reaching 20,000 feet, enough to
reach 98 per cent of all ocean floors. See James A.R. Nafziger, "The Titanic Revisited" (1999) 30 J.
Mar. L. & Com. 311.
4 Timothy J. Runyan, "Shipwreck Legislation and the Preservation of Submerged Artifacts"
(1990) 22 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 31 at 33.
5Allred v. Biegel, 219 S.W. 2d 665 (Mo. App. 1949). Although the canoe was found protruding
from the banks of a river rather than underwater, the case was a seminal one in establishing the
proposition that abandoned property that is "embedded in the soil" vests in the owner of the land
where it is found. For discussion of a Canadian case in which a shipwreck was held to be so embedded,
see text accompanying note 78.
6 R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked&Abandoned Vessel, 9 F. Supp. 2d 624 (E.D. Va. 1998), affd and
rev'd in part, sub nom. R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943 (4th Cir. 1999). In this case the salvor
in possession of the wreck attempted to prohibit Deep Ocean Expeditions from giving tours of the site
to the public for a fee. Shortly after the discovery of the R.M.S. Titanic, the U.S. Congress enacted the
R.M.S. Titanic Maritime Memorial Act of 1986. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 450rr-450rr-6 (1994). This Act
suggested the creation of an international treaty that would prevent unscientific and needlessly
intrusive work on the wreck. This suggestion has not been acted upon. For a discussion of how the case
of the R.M.S. Titanic illustrates the tension between attempts to encourage archaeological data
preservation and the constraints imposed by traditional admiralty law (under which the case has been
litigated), see Terence McQuown, "An Archaeological Argument for the Inapplicability of Admiralty
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and salvors have laid claim to wrecked vessels and appropriated at an
alarming rate what is now recognized as the cultural heritage of
humankind. In response to the need to protect this cultural property, the
General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) adopted the Convention on the Protection
of the Underwater Cultural Heritage on November 2, 2001. Despite its many
proponents, the Convention has numerous detractors who believe that if it
enters into force, it will nullify treasure salvage, an important part of our
legal heritage.
In this article I shall examine the relationship between salvage law
and the underwater heritage law proposed by the Convention, and the
sources of tension between them. A review of the traditional law governing
shipwrecks, salvage law, and the law of finds highlights the problems that
have arisen in respect of claims in both international and territorial waters.
Most of the salvage cases are American, but a consideration of the
Canadian cases illustrates how complex this area of law has become.
Finally, I shall consider the Convention in respect of its purpose, the control
it purports to exercise over the underwater cultural heritage, its proposed
methods of funding, and public awareness and training. By attempting to
interpret the most controversial provisions in relation to the traditional law,
I shall demonstrate that salvage is not completely incompatible with the
preservation of the cultural heritage. Indeed, these laws are
interdependent, each requiring the other to remedy serious deficiencies and
to render the legal protection of historic shipwrecks more effective for all
parties involved.
II. THE TRADITIONAL LAW
A. The Law of Salvage
Salvage is the rescue of any vessel, cargo, freight or other
recognized subject of salvage from danger at sea. Salvage services can be
either contractual or voluntary. A salvage award is given to the person who
has salved the property as compensation for the salvor's efforts. There are
Law in the Disposition of Historic Shipwrecks" (2000) 26 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 289 at 320-22, n. 132.
77 UNESCO, 31st Sess., U.N. Doc. 31 C/24 (2001) [the Convention]. Eighty-seven states voted in
favour of the Convention. Four states voted against (Norway, Russian Federation, Turkey and
Venezuela) and fifteen abstained from voting (Brazil, Columbia, Czech Republic, France, Germany,
Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Iceland, Israel, Netherlands, Paraguay, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
and Uruguay). Under Article 27, the Convention will enter into force three months after the deposit
of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Director-
General of UNESCO.
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three areas of civil salvage:8 property salvage, life salvage, 9 and treasure
salvage. The origins of the law of marine salvage are ancient and can be
traced back to the sea laws of Byzantium and the Mediterranean seaport
cities.'0 The Rhodian Sea Laws, which may have originated from as early
as 900 B.C., allowed a volunteer salvor to claim a reward based on a
percentage of the salved property and the danger involved in the operation.
The laws of Olron, which provided that wrecks, broken parts of ships, and
their lading were to be kept safe for the people who owned them before the
shipwreck, influenced the development of English and other national
maritime laws." No unified law of salvage was applied uniformly and
internationally until 1910, when the first international salvage convention
was adopted.'2 Today, salvage is regulated by the 1910 and 1989 salvage
8 Civil salvage can be distinguished from military or prize salvage as follows:
The Admiralty Court recognises two kinds of salvage, viz., military salvage and civil salvage.
Military salvage is such a service as may become the ground of a demand for reward in a
court sitting as a Prize Court and consists of the rescue of property from the enemy in time
of war. Civil salvage is such a service as may become the ground of a demand for reward in
the court on the civil side of its jurisdiction; it includes the preservation of life or property
from dangers which may be encountered in times of peace and war.
See Francis D. Rose, Kennedy and Rose: The Law of Salvage, 6th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002)
at 10. A discussion of prize salvage, which dates back before Roman times but is described by Rose
as "of virtually no practical importance today," is beyond the scope of this article.
9 Life salvage is the act of saving human lives at sea. Under the general maritime law, a life salvor
has no claim against the person saved, and a salvor who has saved life but no property has no right to
compensation from the owner of the ship or its cargo. This rule has been modified by international
conventions, statutes and case law. Article 16(1) of the 1989 Salvage Convention, see infra note 13 and
accompanying text, precludes any life salvage reward per se, but permits such compensation under
national legislation. Article 16(2) lays down the basic rule that a life salvor who has taken part in
rendering the salvage services is entitled to a fair share of the payment awarded to the salvor for
salving the vessel or other property or for preventing or minimizing damage to the environment. See
generally Geoffrey Brice, Maritime Law of Salvage, 3d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999) at 195-
201; William Tetley, International Maritime and Admiralty Law (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 2002)
at 353-56; Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law, 3d ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Group,
2001) at 860-62; and M. McInnes, "Life Rescue in Maritime Law" (1994) 25 J. Mar. L. & Com. 451.
Schoenbaum, ibid. at 834.
Brice, supra note 9 at 5.
12 The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law respectingAssistance and Salvage at
Sea, 23 September 1910, 212 Cons. T.S. 187 [1910 Salvage Convention] came into force on 1 March
1913. It remains in force for some seventy states.
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conventions, 3 the common law, statute law, and industry practices, such as
Lloyd's Open Forms.
The 1989Salvage Convention replaced the 1910 Salvage Convention
for states that are parties to both conventions to the extent that their
provisions were incompatible. The 1989 Salvage Convention has the force
of law in several states, including the United Kingdom, Canada, and the
United States. 4 Among the goals of the 1989 Salvage Convention was to
update the 1910 Salvage Convention rules and in particular address the
problem of marine pollution. The most significant provision in this regard
is Article 14, which recognizes that a salvor can receive "special
compensation" if the salvor attempts to save a ship or cargo that threatens
damage to the marine environment. The salvor will receive such
compensation, which is equivalent to the salvor's costs, only if the salvor
failed to earn a reward by means of successfully saving the property. The
traditional rule that a salvor will receive remuneration only if the ship is
saved is known as the "no cure, no pay" principle. Where the salvor is
actually successful in preventing or minimizing environmental damage, a
tribunal may allow the special compensation to be increased by up to 30 per
cent, or even 100 per cent in exceptional cases. Article 14 has thus created
an incentive for salvors to attempt salvage of vessels that threaten to pollute
the marine environment even where success is unlikely.
The 1989 Salvage Convention recognizes that most salvage services
today are performed under a contract." Lloyd's Standard Form of Salvage
Agreement, prepared by the Council of Lloyd's and known as Lloyd's Open
Form (LOF), is the most common form of salvage contract in use around
the world. This agreement has also made an exception to the "no cure, no
pay" doctrine in the interest of preventing marine pollution. The most
13 International Convention on Salvage, 2 May 1989, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF. 7/27 [1989 Salvage
Convention], reprinted in [1990] 1 L. M.C.L.Q. 54 (adopted on 28 April 1989 at London, England, and
entered into force as of 14 July 1996).
14 For the United Kingdom, see the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (U.K.), 1995, c. 21, ss. 224(1)
and Sch. 11, Part I; for Canada, see the Canada ShippingAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-9, as am. by S.C. 1993,
c. 36, s. 449.1 [Canada ShippingAct]; see also the Canada ShippingAct, 2001, S.C. 2001, c. 26, s. 142(1)
and Sch. 3, Parts I and 2 [Canada Shipping Act, 2001]. The Canada Shipping Act, 2001 is not yet in
force. The new Act received Royal Assent on 1 November 2001. However, only a few of its provisions,
such as the amendments made to the Shipping Conferences Exemption Act, 1987, R.S.C. 1985 (3d
Supp.), c. 17, have come into force. The majority of provisions of the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 will
come into force when the Regulations have been developed and put in place. The United States
ratified the 1989 Salvage Convention on 31 October 1991, and deposited its instrument of ratification
with the International Maritime Organization on 27 March 1992. However, the 1989 Salvage
Convention did not come into force in the U.S. until 14 July 1996, when it came into force
internationally. See Tetley, supra note 9 at 326, n. 23.
15 Supra note 13, Article 6(1). See also Tetley, supra note 9 at 334, n. 55 and accompanying text.
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recent versions of the form take into account Article 14 of the 1989 Salvage
Convention and entitle salvors to some compensation if they have used
their "best endeavours" to prevent or minimize environmental damage,
regardless of whether they have saved the ship or cargo, or both. LOF 2000
deviates even further from the "no cure, no pay" principle. The parties to
a LOF 2000 salvage contract can invoke a "Special Compensation
Protection and Indemnity Clause." "scoPIC 2000," as this clause has come
to be known, guarantees remuneration for salvors' exertions, including a
margin of profit, whether or not the vessel poses any threat to the
environment, and whether or not their exertions prove successful in
preserving any property.
16
In the absence of a binding agreement fixing the amount of
remuneration, 17 the salvor is entitled to monetary compensation once the
property has been salved and brought to a place of safety. Traditionally,
several factors have been taken into account in determining the amount of
a reward. Regarding the salved property, the factors are the danger to life,
danger to property, and the value of the property salved; regarding the
salvors, the factors include the danger to and value of property used in the
salvage service, time spent and the extent and skill of the work done, and
16 See Tetley, ibid. at 342-45; and Geoffrey Brice, "Salvage and the Role of the Insurer" (2000)
L.M.C.L.Q. 26 at 30. Marine insurance plays an important role in determining proprietary rights to
wrecks, especially more recent ones. In the case of a constructive total loss of a ship or of goods, the
insured may give up or "abandon" proprietary rights in the property to the insurer, treating the loss
as an actual total loss. The insurer thereby assumes proprietary rights. In the case of a total loss of the
whole ship or an "apportionable part" of the goods, the insurer becomes entitled to take over the
insured's interest in whatever may remain of the subject matter paid for. The insurer is then
subrogated to all the insured's rights and remedies in respect of the subject matter, from the time of
the casualty. See Tetley, supra note 9 at 612, 615-16. This will depend on specific circumstances, as an
insurer may not want to risk assuming more liabilities by exercising such rights. Once the original
owners are indemnified, however, they cease to retain proprietary rights in competition with the
insurer. See Tetley, supra note 9 at 591-92. As the international dimensions of treasure salvage
increase, so too do the insurance implications. Wrecks and their cargoes may be insured in different
parts of the world, giving rise to difficult legal questions. Brice, supra note 9 at 269, provides the
example of the direct effect of American concepts of the retention or abandonment of title on London
underwriters claiming title to submerged vessels.
17 Such agreements are rare. See Rose, supra note 8 at 642. An example of a salvage operation
with a predetermined fee negotiated is the Irving Whale, an oil barge that sank in 1970 in the Gulf of
St. Lawrence while on its way from Halifax, Nova Scotia to Bathurst, New Brunswick. In June, 1995,
the federal government of Canada awarded a contract to Donjon McAllister Joint Venture to lift the
Irving Whale for an estimated $12.1 million. The barge, which attracted widespread media attention
due to its leakage of oil and PCBs, was successfully lifted and transported to Halifax in 1996. See
Environment Canada, Du Contrat Pour Renflouer L'rving Whale (9 June 1995), online:
<http://www.ns.ec.gc.ca/whale2/jun9.html> (date accessed: 14 November 2003), announcing the
awarding of the contract.
[VOL. 42, NO. I
Admiralty Law
the risks of liability. These factors are now enumerated by statute 8 along
with others such as the promptness of the services rendered and the
availability and efficiency of equipment for salvage operations.' 9 If the
parties cannot agree on the quantum of the salvage reward, then it is
decided by a court or arbitral tribunal.20
Voluntary salvage occurs less often than contractual salvage, but
has nevertheless given rise to intriguing treasure salvage cases. "Pure"
salvage, as it is called, involves the salvor assuming the risk of his operation
with no guarantee of a reward. The amount of the award, if any, is
determined by future legal proceedings. There are three criteria required
for a salvor to establish a valid "pure" salvage claim. First, the services
rendered must have been voluntary. This means that the salvor cannot have
been under any legal obligation to render assistance. Second, the salvor
must have been successful in salving some of the property. The saving of
property is the benefit conferred upon the owner of the vessel. Third, the
property must have been in peril. The first and second criteria for a valid
salvage claim are fairly straightforward. The third criterion, that the
property must be in marine peril, is by contrast highly controversial.
The controversy lies in whether a sunken ship should be the object
of salvage. In contemporary salvage, a ship in distress is usually considered
to be one that is not yet lost. There is a wide variety of items that qualify as
salvable property.2' As the law stands, any vessel, whether it be stranded,
sunken, or otherwise imperilled in navigable waters, is held to be a proper
object for salvage, as well as her apparel, stores, bunkers, cargo or freight
(including passage money).22 Aircraft, hovercraft, and their cargo are
recognized subjects of salvage by international convention and statute.
Under English law, royal fish such as whales and sturgeon also qualify.
18 See e.g. Canada Shipping Act, supra note 14, Sch. V, Art. 13(1).
19 Tetley, supra note 9 at 338-41.
20 In the majority of cases, salvage awards are assessed by arbitrators. LOF provides for arbitral
awards: Rose, supra note 8 at 643. Insurers, desperate for an increase in their own business as
underwriters and arbitrators of salvage cases, have tried to reduce the dependence of salvors world-
wide on Lloyd's of London for arbitration, but with limited success. See Gerard J. Mangone, United
States Admiralty Law (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1997) at 208.
21 See generally Brice, supra note 9 at 209-10, and Rose, supra note 8 at 78-158. The type of
property that may be salved can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See William Tetley, Maritime
Liens and Clains, 2d ed. (Montreal: International Shipping Publications, 1998) at 355-69 for a helpful
outline of salvable property in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and France.
22 Even money found floating on dead bodies has been held to be subject to a salvage award. See
Broere v. Two Thousand One Hundred Thirty-Three Dollars, 72 F.Supp. 115 at 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1947),
aff'd, 78 F.Supp. 635 at 637 (E.D.N.Y. 1948); Gardnerv. Ninety-Nine Gold Coins, 111 F. 552 at 553
(D. Mass. 1899).
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Among the property that is exempt are the personal effects of the master
and crew, the wearing apparel of passengers and other effects carried by
them for their daily personal use. Many believe that this doctrine should
not apply to underwater cultural heritage, especially historic shipwrecks.23
Wreck and derelict have long been common subjects of salvage.24
The right to claim a ship as "wreck of the sea" has its roots in English law
during the Anglo-Saxon era.25 Wreck salvage refers to the salvage of
property historically classified as either flotsam, jetsam, ligan (or lagan), or
wreck. "Flotsam" is property found floating after a ship has sunk. "Jetsam"
refers to property thrown overboard to lighten a ship that is in danger of
sinking. "Ligan" (or "lagan") is property on the sea that is attached to
buoys. "Wreck" refers to goods that have come to land after shipwreck.
Property in all four of these categories may be salved at common law.26 For
the purposes of statutory provisions relating to salvage and wreck, the
modern definition of "wreck" has expanded to include jetsam, flotsam,
lagan and derelict.27 The 1989 Salvage Convention does not mention wreck.
However, it is assumed that the convention includes wrecks due to its
generally inclusive nature.28
Commonwealth jurisdictions have the statutory institution of
Receiver of Wreck, designed to prevent plundering of wrecked vessels and
their cargoes while recognizing the rights of salvors. "Wreck" in this context
primarily refers to contemporaneous wrecks, but it can also apply to
23 See Anastasia Strati, The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage:An Emerging Objective of
the Contemporary Law of the Sea (London: Kluwer Law International, 1995) at 48-49.
24 A derelict vessel is one that has been abandoned at sea by its crew without hope of recovering
or intention of returning to it. See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed., vol. 43(1) (London:
Butterworths, 1997) at 626.
2 5 For a historical perspective, see Rose Melikan, "Shippers, Salvors, and Sovereigns: Competing
Interests in the Medieval Law of Shipwreck" (1990) 11 J. Legal Hist. 163. One of the more interesting
laws defining shipwrecks was the first Statute of Westminster, which provided that if a man, cat or dog
escaped alive from a ship, it could not be considered a wreck by virtue of the fact that it was retained
by its owners. See The Statutes of Westminster, 1272, 3 Edw., § 4.
26 See Brice, supra note 9 at 278-79; Tetley, supra note 9 at 322, n. 7.
27 Halsbuty's, supra note 24 at 626.
28 Rose, supra note 8 at 106, explains that
[c]onsequently, if as a matter of construction wrecks fall within the terms of the [1989
Salvage] Convention, it will apply to them. The Convention applies generally to any
property which is not permanently and intentionally attached to the shoreline. It can
therefore confidently be asserted that it applies to vessels or goods which are afloat.
Property which has sunk and become attached to the shoreline should also be covered since,
even if it has become permanently attached, it is unlikely to have become so attached
intentionally. [emphasis in original]
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archaeological or historical wrecks. Pursuant to Chapter 2 of Part IX of the
Merchant Shipping Act 1995, for example, any person who finds or takes
possession of a wreck in United Kingdom waters, regardless of whether or
not he is the owner, must report his discovery to the Receiver of Wreck. 29
The Receiver is then responsible for the preservation of the wreck and the
provision of an appropriate salvage award for the finder. Either the Crown
or the owner of the property provides a monetary award, or the property
itself is awarded to the finder. The Receiver may have to locate the owner
of the wreck so that this person can claim it. An owner of a find that is over
one hundred years old will be advised as to its archaeological importance.
Such property is usually sold to a museum and the proceeds of this sale will
form the salvage payment.30 If no one establishes a claim within one year
from the time when the wreck came into the Receiver's possession, the
Receiver must dispose of the wreck. Unclaimed wreck found within the
waters of the United Kingdom becomes the property of the Crown, and
that found outside those waters is returned to the finder. Despite the
protective nature of the Receiver's work, however,.many question whether
a sunken ship or wreck is truly in danger for the purpose of a salvage
claim.3
The degree of peril is important in determining the amount of the
salvage award. Therefore, one of the most important elements for a court
to consider in awarding salvage is whether a sunken ship or wreck is in real
danger. This is a factual question determined on a case-by-case basis. There
only has to be some peril to satisfy this requirement, or a reasonable
apprehension of loss. 32 The loss can be pecuniary, or stem from the fact that
the ship is in an unknown location, has been injured by the elements, or is
merely stranded. According to Judge Anthony Mason in a 1977 decision of
the Australian High Court, a salvor need only "recover the ship, its cargo
or a part thereof," because "[s]alvage is not limited to recovery of property
in or from a ship which is actually in distress; it extends to the recovery of
property in or from a ship which has lain at the bottom of the sea for a long
29 For a general description of these provisions, see Brice, supra note 9 at 299-300; and Rose,
supra note 8 at 330. Under section 255(1) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, supra note 14, the term
"wreck" includes jetsam, flotsam, lagan and derelict found in or on the shores of the sea or any tidal
water.
30 U.K. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency, "The Receiver of Wreck," online: BBCi
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/archaeology/marine_receivel.shtml> (date accessed: 14 November
2003).
3' Brice, supra note 9 at 56, 276; Rose, supra note 8 at 189.
32 See The Saragossa, 21 F. Cas. 425 at 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1867).
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time."33 Yet finding an element of danger in order to justify a grant of
salvage rights over a wreck has been difficult for some American courts.
For example, in Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that "[T]here is no dispute that the Atocha was lost. Even after the
discovery of the vessel's location it is still in peril of being lost through the
actions of the elements., 34 In another case it was held that a shipwreck
could be in danger due to pirates.35 Other courts have confined themselves
to less creative rulings, simply holding that once underwater, property loses
its value.36 Ships that show no sign of deterioration in their underwater
environment, however, are probably not in sufficiently "real" danger to
justify salvage.
A salvor is not entitled to a salvage award if he has caused the
wreck's peril. Salvage law is guided by equity, and salvors must therefore
have "clean hands" to qualify for remuneration.37 Often a ship that has
been underwater for a length of time has reached an equilibrium with its
environment. Disturbing this equilibrium could cause chemical changes
which in turn bring about the ship's rapid deterioration. 38 In Ontario v. Mar-
Dive Corp., a case that will be examined in more detail below, Justice
Douglas H. Lissaman questioned this aspect of salvage. At issue in the case
was a claim to salvage the Atlantic, which sank in 1852 and is firmly buried
33Robinson v. Western Australian Museum (1977), 16 A.L.R. 623 (H.C.A.) at 663. This case
involved a salvage claim to the Gilt Dragon, a Dutch ship that crashed into a reef forty miles from
present-day Perth on its way from the East Indies to Holland. The plaintiff had discovered its remains
and retrieved numerous artifacts from its wreckage.
569 F.2d 330 at 337 (1978).
35Cobb Coin Co., Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 549 F.Supp. 540
at 557 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
36 Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. 56 F.3d 556 (4th Cir.
1995). Salvage services will not normally be rendered if the property is valueless, as these services are
usually considered necessary only when the danger threatens the economic value of the subject of
salvage: see Rose, supra note 8 at 170.
37See Joseph C. Sweeney, "An Overview of Commercial Salvage Principles in the Context of
Marine Archaeology" (1999) 30 J. Mar. L. & Com. 185 at 193, for a discussion of the absence of clean
hands as a defence to salvage. In Dannerv. United States, 99 F.Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), a salvage
award was denied where salvors looted the salved vessel and prevented assistance by other salvors. In
a more recent treasure salvage case, Black Gold Marine, Inc. v. Jackson Marine Co., 759 F.2d 466 (5th
Cir. 1985), a contract salvage claim was contaminated by fraud, compulsion, and unconscionable
conduct.
38 James M. Parrent, "Treasure Hunters in the Carribean: The Current Crisis" in James P.
Delgado, ed., UndenvaterArchaeology Proceedings from the Society for HistoricalArchaeology Conference
(Pleasant Hill, Calif.: Society for Historical Archaeology, 1988) 32 at 35.
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in about thirteen feet of mud at the bottom of Lake Erie. It was unlikely
that the ship could be better preserved by salvage, Lissaman noted:
Danger of loss or damage to the subject matter of the service is the very foundation of a
claim to salvage and the degree of danger has been said to be the most important element
to consider in awarding salvage. ... [Tihe Atlantic has been resting undisturbed on the
lakebed of Lake Erie since she sank in 1852. Therefore, I conclude that the salvage
proposed by Mar-Dive will not save the Atlantic from any danger.
39
The salvors had argued that the ship was in peril of being destroyed by
zebra mussels, the combined weight of which would eventually cause the
vessel's structural collapse. However, a marine archaeologist testified that
the exposed part of the Atlantic was not large enough for a significant
number of zebra mussels to attach themselves. The court agreed.
The use of damaging methods of excavation also causes a wreck's
peril. In an attempt to discourage this destructive treatment of wrecks,
some American courts have considered whether the salvor's work met
archaeological standards in the assessment of the salvage award. In
Columbus-America Discovery Group v. The Unidentified, Wrecked and
Abandoned Sailing Vessel (The Central America), a case involving a
nineteenth-century wreck laden with a cargo of gold, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit said that an extra factor should be added: "the
degree to which salvors have worked to protect the historical and
archaeological value of the wreck and the items salved."4 But whether
courts really understand the principles of archaeological excavation is
another matter. Critics have pointed out that the emphasis in judgments
seems to be on measurement, conservation and popular publications.41 A
commonly cited example demonstrates this:
The district court noted further that Columbus-America had published a book and
promoted a television account of its endeavors, and had provided educational materials to
schools interested in teaching their students about the CentralAmerica and its history. The
court found that "the efforts to preserve the site and its artifacts have not been equaled in
any other case" ... 42
Although courts have decided that "salvors who seek to preserve
and enhance the historical value of ancient shipwrecks should be justly
39 (1996), 141 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 592 and 638 [Mar-Dive].
974 F.2d 450 at 468 (4th Cir. 1992) [Columbus-America].
O'Keefe, supra note 2 at 228.
42 Supra note 36 at 573.
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rewarded, 43 they are nevertheless at a disadvantage in properly assessing
the archaeological methods used if they have to rely on the salvors'
evidence. It is unlikely that salvors would produce evidence against their
own interest.4 A court might refuse to grant an award, either fully or
partially, if it discovered that a salvor's excavation had not conformed to
archaeological standards. When courts are willing to grant awards for
partial excavations, however, they are in effect encouraging the irreparable
dismantlement of a site that cannot be put back together again. Some
historians and archaeologists argue that a wreck site should not be
abandoned to the public until qualified authorities have assessed the site's
significance to the national and international heritage.45
Aside from equity, salvage is driven by commercialism. 46 The
guiding premise behind the theory of salvage is to return goods to the
stream of commerce.47 As a result, there are aspects of the salvage award
that run counter to important objectives of cultural heritage law, such as
maintaining collections from sites as entities. First, the salvage award can
never exceed the value of the property salved. Although there is no fixed
rate for a salvage award, they have traditionally been generous. Salvors,
under intense time and financial pressures and threatened by rivals, are
therefore tempted to extract commercially valuable material as fast as
possible to the detriment of other materials in a wreck. Second, a salvage
award is usually paid from the proceeds of the sale of the maritime
property or the salvor is awarded the material raised. In the latter case, the
material is often dispersed into the antique trade. For example, in 1986
porcelain and gold salved from the Geldermahlsen, a Dutch vessel wrecked
in the South China Sea in 1752, was sold at Christie's, one of the world's
biggest international auction houses. The auction raised U.S. $16 million
and established Christie's pre-eminence in the sale of underwater cultural
heritage.49 Very few courts have refused to grant a salvage award based on
43 Supra note 40 at 468.
44 O'Keefe, supra note 2 at 229.
45 See Runyan, supra note 4 at 32.
4 6 See Edward W. Horan, "Organizing, Manning, and Financing a Treasure Salvage Operation"
(1999) 30 J. Mar. L. & Com. 235.
47 See Thompson M. Mayes, "Current Legal Issues in the Law of Historic Shipwrecks" (1986)
5 Preservation L. Rep. 2027 at 2039.
48 O'Keefe, supra note 2 at 228.
49Facts from UNESCO Press Release, dated 29 October 2001. A treaty that has addressed the
problem of dispersal is the Agreement Between Australia and The Netherlands Concerning Old Dutch
Shipwrecks, 1972, 18 A.T.S. It provides for the disposition of material from wrecks, ensuring that "the
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policy considerations that it is inappropriate to rescue marine antiquities
for the purpose of selling them. Nevertheless, in Subaqueous Exploration
andArchaeology, Ltd. v. Unidentified Wrecked andAbandoned Vessel5" and
Chance v. Certain Artifacts Found and Salvaged from the Nashville,51 the
salvors were denied an in specie award of historic artifacts on these grounds.
Some have argued that further proscription of treasure salvage will
promote a black market in looted and counterfeit artifacts. However, this
argument can be effectively countered by the fact that an active black
market already exists. 2 Since no effective deterrents to protect the
underwater cultural heritage have yet been put in place, we cannot
conclusively determine whether stricter legal protection of shipwrecks on
an international level will curb these illegal activities. By contrast, there are
some who believe that treasure hunters have contributed greatly to our
understanding of maritime history and should not be condemned or
stopped from continuing their efforts. One scholar expresses the view that
"[i]t is a simple fact that with bureaucratic archaeologists in control, the era
of private enterprise recovery of ancient shipwrecks will be over."53
The 1989 Salvage Convention does not define the relationship
between salvage law and protection of the underwater cultural heritage.
The only reference to underwater heritage is in the form of a reservation.
Parties may reserve the right not to apply the provisions of the 1989 Salvage
Convention "when the property involved is maritime cultural property of
prehistoric, archaeological or historic interest and is situated on the sea-
bed," thereby excluding salvage law from national law governing
underwater heritage. 4 Canada, for example, made such a reservation in
ratifying the 1989 Salvage Convention. The United States has also done
this to some extent by enacting the Abandoned Shipwreck Act56 and other
laws to protect heritage within federal offshore jurisdiction. But courts are
still attempting to apply the principles of salvage to wrecks beneath
international waters in addition to those within twenty-four miles from their
total assemblage should be capable of reassembly to allow further statistical and scholarly analysis."
50 577 F.Supp. 597 (D. Md. 1983).
51 606 F.Supp. 801 (S.D. Ga. 1984) [Chance].
52 See McQuown, supra note 6 at 326, n. 145.
53 See Melvin A. Fisher, "TheAbandoned ShipwrecksAct: The Role of Private Enterprise" (1988)
12 Colum.-V.L.A. J.L. & Arts 373 at 376.
54 Supra note 13, Article 30(l)(d).
55 Tetley, supra note 21 at 364.
56 4 3 U.S.C. § 2101-2106 (1987).
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coasts. The federal courts of the United States have developed an extra-
territorial high seas jurisdiction known as quasi in rem jurisdiction,
triggered by the salvor bringing some property from the wreck before the
court.5 7 A court thereby asserted jurisdiction over the wreck of the Andrea
Doria, an Italian luxury liner that sank following a collision on the high seas
in 1956, when the-salvor appeared with mosaic friezes recovered from the
panelling of the ship. American courts have also taken jurisdiction over
wrecks in other states' territorial waters, such as the RMS Lusitania, which
lies within twelve miles of the coast of Ireland. 9 With the advent of the
UNESCO Convention, however, the law of salvage will cease to have free
reign over the exploration and exploitation of shipwrecks beyond the
margin of federal jurisdiction.
B. The Law of Finds
More than a century ago, an American court held that "[i]n a
barbarous state of society wrecks were treated as the lawful plunder of the
first comer .....0 Although traditionally it has not been applied to historic
shipwrecks, the law of finds has become an important part of American law
in respect of underwater cultural heritage.6t In the United States, once an
admiralty court establishes jurisdiction, the next step is to decide whether
to apply the law of finds or the law of salvage to the case at hand.62 The
object of the law of finds is to vest title in the first person who reduces
abandoned property to his or her possession, unlike salvage law, where title
to property is not at issue because it is assumed that the property still
57 Brice, supra note 9 at 283.
5 8 J.F Moyerv. The Wreck of the Andrea Doria, 836 F.Supp. 1099 (D.N.J. 1993).
5 9 Bemis v. Lusitania, 884 F.Supp. 1042 (E.D. Va. 1995). The Lusitania was a cunard liner on a
transatlantic voyage from New York to Liverpool when it was torpedoed off the Old Head of Kinsdale
on May 7, 1915. The U.S. court has awarded the ship and cargo to U.S. citizens, although the Irish
government has declared the Lusitania to be a protected national historic site.
60 Murphy v. Dunham, 38 F. 503 at 507 (E.D. Mich. 1889).
61 In Bemis v. Lusitania, supra note 59, the court stated at 1048-49 that "[t]raditionally the law
of finds was applied only to maritime property which had never been owned by anyone. Yet recent
trends suggest applying the law of finds when there has been a finding that the sunken property has
been abandoned by its previous owners." The case of Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499 (1861), is
considered by at least one writer to be the first reported U.S. case in which the law of finds was applied
to a sunken shipwreck. See Craig N. McLean, "Law of Salvage Reclaimed: Columbus-America
Discovery v. Atlantic Mutual" (1993) 13 Bridgeport L. Rev. 477 at 480.
62 For an analysis of the relationship between these two areas of law, see Mark A. Wilder,
"Application of Salvage Law and the Law of Finds to Sunken Shipwreck Discoveries" (2000) 67 Def.
Couns. J. 92.
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belongs to someone. Salvage law focuses instead on the right of the salvor
to compensation for his successful efforts at saving the property.
The maritime law of finds is substantially similar to the law of finds
as applied on land.63 The object of the finder is to obtain legal title. A
finder claims property at sea on the premise that the property has never
been owned by anyone, such as plants or fish, or has been abandoned by the
owner. Alleging that the owner has no intention of returning, the finder has
to demonstrate an intent to reduce the property to his possession and show
that he is exercising effort and control to make it his possession. Once a
finder has taken control over the abandoned property, he holds title to it.
This title is good against the whole world, including the original owner. In
respect of shipwrecks, there is an important distinction between the English
and American rules. Under English law, the sovereign can assert its right
over the wreck if no valid claim is made by the owner. Under American law,
in the same circumstances, the finder, not the sovereign, becomes the
owner.
An important element in determining ownership of marine
property depends on where the property was found. At common law, there
is an exception to the rule that a finder of abandoned property takes title
to the property when he reduces it to his possession, even if it is discovered
on another person's land. The title to abandoned property that is
embedded in the soil (or in a river or sea floor, as the case may be) does not
vest in its finder, but in the owner of the land where the property is found.'
Similarly, where the owner of the locus where the property is found asserts
"constructive possession" over the property, it is not considered
abandoned, and title to it vests in the owner of the land.6"
American courts have more often applied the principles of salvage
than the law of finds to historic shipwrecks. Some argue that salvage law
encourages less competitive, secretive conduct than the law of finds because
it awards payment for partial service and requires a lower standard of
possession. From a public policy perspective, salvage supports the
preservation of maritime property and returns it to a use beneficial to
63 See Mangone, supra note 20 at 223-29.
64 See e.g. Chance, supra note 51, where the court held that a ship which had sunk 120 years
earlier and was embedded in the soil underlying the Ogeechee River belonged to the State of Georgia
because riverbeds are the property of the state. The Court in Mar-Dive referred to the definition of
"embeddedness" adopted in Chance. See supra note 39 at 634.
65 In Klein v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 568 F.Supp. 1562 (S.D. Fla.
1983), the court ruled that the United States had constructive possession and intent to control an
eighteenth-century English war vessel embedded in its property, thus it was not lost. The vessel was
embedded in submerged lands in Biscayne National Park, Florida. These lands were owned by the
United States and controlled by the National Park System.
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society.66 In Columbus-America, the court articulated this preference for
salvage:
... when sunken ships or their cargo are rescued from the bottom of the ocean by those
other than the owners, courts favor applying the law of salvage over the law of finds. Finds
law should be applied, however, in situations where the previous owners are found to have
abandoned their property. Such abandonment must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence, though, such as an owner's expressed declaration abandoning title. Should the
property encompass an ancient and longlost shipwreck, a court may infer abandonment.
Such an inference would be improper, though, should a previous owner appear and assert
his ownership interests; in such a case the normal presumption would apply and an
• .. 67
abandonment would have to be proved by strong and convincing evidence.
It appears, then, that the law of finds should apply only where the owner
has expressly and publicly abandoned his property, and where no one
comes forward to claim the recovered property.68
C. The Law Governing Shipwrecks in Canada
Canadian maritime law is a body of federal law, and as such is
uniform across Canada and excludes provincial law. Admiralty jurisdiction
in Canada is concurrent as between provincial superior and inferior courts
that have maritime jurisdiction, and the Federal Court of Canada.69 Most
admiralty and maritime cases are taken before the Federal Court. Both
systems provide the right to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
"Navigation and shipping" are among the subjects over which the federal
66 Supra note 62 at 94.
6 7 Supra note 40 at 460-61.
68 Schoenbaum, supra note 9 at 800. The issue of abandonment has been problematic for
American courts. In recent treasure salvage cases such as California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523
U.S. 491 (1998) and Fairport International Exploration, Inc. v. Shipwrecked Vessel known as the Captain
Lawrence, 177 F. 3d 491 (6th Cir. 1999), for example, the courts have split as to whether abandonment
can be inferred from the passage of time. See John Paul Jones, "The United States Supreme Court and
Treasure Salvage: Issues Remaining After Brother Jonathan" (1999) 30 J. Mar. L. & Com. 205 at 214-
25, n. 2.
6 9 Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, s. 22(1). Under s. 22(1), the Federal Court of Canada
has a wide jurisdiction over any remedy sought or claim for relief made under or by virtue of "...
Canadian maritime law or any other law of Canada relating to any matter coming within the class of
subject of navigation and shipping, except to the extent that jurisdiction has been otherwise specially
assigned." See also ITO - International Terminal Operators Ltd. v. Miida Electronics Inc., [198611 S.C.R.
752; Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437; Tetley, supra note 9 at 434-35. Arthur J. Stone outlines
the evolution of the Federal Court of Canada's admiralty jurisdiction in "Canada's Admiralty Court
in the Twentieth Century" (2002) 47 McGill L.J. 511.
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Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction under section 91(10) of the
Constitution Act, 1867.70
Like the United Kingdom, Canada has the institution of Receiver
of Wrecks. Appointed by the federal government under Part VI of the
Canada ShippingAct,7' Receivers can be found on both the East and West
coasts (Halifax and Vancouver), where most issues involving wrecks arise.
The Receiver has jurisdiction over any wreck, which is defined broadly.72
Anyone who discovers a wrecked vessel or part of such a vessel, including
cargo, must report the discovery to the Receiver of Wrecks and also deliver
it to the Receiver, who determines the reward. It is the Receiver's
responsibility to try and locate the owner, and to dispose of the wreck if no
one claims it. After the payment of expenses, costs, fees and salvage, the
proceeds are to be paid over to the Receiver General to form part of the
Consolidated Revenue Fund.
Under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001, the Receiver continues to
have jurisdiction over wreck. 73 The 2001 Act no longer requires wreck to be
delivered to a Receiver of Wreck as it has been deemed more practical and
cost-effective for the person who found the object to simply report the find
and follow the instructions given by the Receiver. The Canada Shipping
Act, 2001 also contains new authority for the Minister of Fisheries and
Oceans and the Minister of Heritage Canada to jointly develop Heritage
Wreck/Receiver of Wreck Regulations which could restrict access to wrecks
that are considered to be of heritage value.74 There may well be overlap
70 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
71 Supra note 14, ss. 422-75.
72 Pursuant to the Canada ShippingAct, supra note 14, s. 2, wreck includes the following: "jetsam,
flotsam, lagan and derelict found in or on the shores of the sea or of any tidal water, or of any of the
inland waters of Canada; cargo, stores and tackle of any vessel and of all parts of the vessel separated
therefrom; the property of shipwrecked persons; and any wrecked aircraft, any part or cargo of any
wrecked aircraft and any property in the possession of persons on board any aircraft that is wrecked,
stranded or in distress."
Part 7 of the Canada Shipping Act, 2001, supra note 14, ss. 153-164, governs wreck. "Wreck"
is defined in section 153 as jetsam, flotsam, lagan and derelict and any other thing that was part of or
on a wrecked vessel, as well as aircraft or parts thereof wrecked, stranded or in distress in waters.
See Canada, Fisheries & Oceans Canada, Canada Shipping Act, 2001: Regulatory Reform,
Questions andAnswers (Ottawa: Fisheries & Oceans Canada Communications Branch, 2003), online:
<http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/csa-lmmc/csainfo/Q&Ae.htm> (date accessed: 13 November 2003). This
regulatory reform process will be carried out in two phases over the next several years. The new
Canada ShippingAct, 2001 reorganizes, updates and streamlines the current Canada ShippingAct. For
example, it reduces instances where the Federal Court will have exclusive admiralty jurisdiction. The
regulatory project is linked with the development of regulations regarding the salvage of wreck or
classes of wreck under Part 6 of the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 under the jurisdiction of Transport
Canada. A second link is with the UNESCO initiative dealing with the underwater cultural heritage
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with provincial and territorial legislation in the administration of these
regulations. Although this collaboration should help protect and preserve
shipwrecks that have cultural or historical significance from being looted
or damaged, conflicts may arise between the federal government and the
provinces. However, before the regulations are in place, consultations will
be held with the diving community, salvage operators, provinces, aboriginal
groups, and other stakeholders. These consultations were scheduled to
commence in the fall of 2003."5
Canadian courts have not encountered the multitude of treasure
salvage cases that have come before their American counterparts. In fact,
there have been only two reported Canadian decisions to date. The first is
Blunden v. Storm,76 a 1971 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada. In
that case, a partner withdrew from a formal partnership that had been
formed to search for and salve the wreck of a French vessel, Le Chameau.
The ship had sunk off the coast of Nova Scotia in 1725 and reportedly had
on board a quantity of gold and silver coins. When the partner secretly
located the treasure in the area previously claimed by the partnership, the
Court held that he must share the treasure with the other partners. Blunden
is usually classified as a partnership case,77 and as such contributes little to
treasure salvage jurisprudence in Canada. However, the second case, Mar-
Dive,78 is particularly noteworthy. Judge Lissaman held that the wreck of
the Atlantic, a U.S. steamship that sank in Canadian waters in 1852, had
become the property of the Crown in Right of Ontario. The decision, which
was expected to be overturned, 9 is worth considering in some detail as
under the jurisdiction of Heritage Canada. See Canada, Fisheries & Oceans Canada, Canada Shipping
Act, 2001: Regulatory Reform, Questions and Answers (Ottawa: Fisheries & Oceans Canada
Communications Branch, 2003), online: <http:/www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/csa-lmmc/proje.htm> (date
accessed: 13 November 2003).
75 See Canada, Fisheries & Oceans Canada, Canada ShippingAct 2001: Regulatory Reform, Public
Consultations (Ottawa: Fisheries & Oceans Canada Communications Branch, 2003) online:
<http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/csa-lmmc/cons-e.htm> (date accessed: 13 January 2004).
76 [1972] S.C.R. 135 [Blunden].
7 7 Steven R. Yormak, "Canadian Treasure: Law and Lore" (1999) 30 J. Mar. L. & Corn. 229. This
is the source for several statements in my discussion of Ontario v. Mar-Dive Corp.
78 Supra note 39.
Mar-Dive initially appealed the decision but gave up, apparently because their company ran
out of money. Stephen Borsse and Joe Morgan, the diver and treasure hunter who formed the Mar-
Dive team, have since set their sights on wrecks in the Caribbean. See Mark Bourrie, "In Court Over
Ghost Gold: The Atlantic Case" (2001) 25 Can. Law. 35 at 38. Meanwhile, Steven Yormak, a London,
Ontario lawyer, is trying to reverse the Atlantic judgment. He is representing American diver Gary
Gentile in a case challenging the authority of the City of Hamilton and Province of Ontario to restrict
access to the wrecks of the Hamilton and the Scourge, two U.S. warships that sank in Lake Ontario
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another example of the controversy surrounding claims to historic
shipwrecks.
Two decades after the Atlantic had sunk, the Western Wrecking
Company, an American firm, purchased title to the wreck from the captain
who owned her. The company began salving the wreck, but ceased
operations after only a few months. In 1914, the company's articles of
incorporation were revoked. No further claims were made to the Atlantic
until 1984, when Canadian Michael Fletcher located the vessel. During the
next five years, he made numerous dives, collected artifacts, placed dive
lines around the site, and videotaped it. But in 1989, American Stephen
Borsse also located the wreck. Borsse returned several times with an
American colleague, sometimes using the dive lines left by Fletcher and
retrieving artifacts. By 1991, Borsse and three other Americans were
seeking to obtain legal title to the Atlantic.
In order to claim legal title, the Americans formed two new
companies, Mar-Dive Corporation and Atlantic Western Limited. They
then revived Western Wrecking, which purportedly transferred title to
Atlantic Western, which in turn entered into an agreement with Mar-Dive
under which the latter agreed to salve the wreck. Finally, Borsse and his
partners took several of the retrieved artifacts to California (where Mar-
Dive was headquartered) and commenced an in rem suit. In March 1992,
the United States District Court for the Central District of California
issued an order recognizing Atlantic Western as the undisputed owner of
the Atlantic. Fletcher was ordered to stay away from the wreck. Fletcher,
joined by lawyers representing the Government of Canada and the
Province of Ontario, was soon challenging Borsse and his colleagues in a
Canadian court.
Mar-Dive submitted that it was the owner of the Atlantic. It had
three main arguments. First, the Atlantic had been an American ship, as
had been the vessel with which it collided. Second, when the ship sank, it
had been travelling between two American ports. Third, Canada was
obligated to defer to the American view of the case pursuant to a 1908
treaty between Great Britain and the United States that regulated wrecking
and salvage in the Great Lakes.8" Fletcher countered these arguments by
maintaining that he was the first recent finder and, as a result, his rights
were superior. However, Fletcher's position and interests were taken over
during the War of 1812. See James Elliott, "Diver Sues for Access to Wrecks: Hamilton and Scourge
are Target of Suit" The Hamilton Spectator (23 December 2000) A17. The case is pending.
80 Treaty between the United States and Great Britain Concerning Reciprocal Rights for the United
States and Canada in the Conveyance of Prisoners and Wrecking and Salvage, 18 May 1908,35 Stat. 2035.
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by the Province of Ontario following an agreement reached prior to trial.
The federal government withdrew from the case.
Judge Lissaman awarded rights to the Province of Ontario for
several reasons." First, the judgments of the U.S. court were not
enforceable in Ontario because there was no "real and substantial
connection" between California and the site of the wreck, and it was
contrary to public policy to recognize a judgment that had been based on
misleading information. Second, the Atlantic had been abandoned, if not
when she sank, then when Western Wrecking ceased its salvaging
operations, or failing that, when Western Wrecking's articles of
incorporation were revoked. Third, the wreck was not simply "floating" in
the mud as Mar-Dive contended, but had become embedded at the bottom
of Lake Erie, and was thus the property of the Province of Ontario. Even
if the wreck was not embedded, the Province could assert title to her on the
basis of the royal prerogative. In Judge Lissaman's view, the Canada
ShippingAct did not transfer the province's rights over wrecks to the federal
government.
As Yormak points out, the ruling in Mar-Dive raised several
questions about Canada's law in respect of historic shipwrecks.82 Judge
Lissaman held that the salvage provisions of the Canada Shipping Act do
not apply to provincial territorial waters, leaving one to speculate as to
which bodies of water they ought to apply. He also found that salvage
pertains only to contemporary vessels faced with marine peril-does
salvage not pertain to any historic wreck, then? In addition, Judge
Lissaman dismissed the 1908 treaty as irrelevant because Mar-Dive failed
to comply with one of its terms, namely the requirement to notify Canadian
officials of their discovery of the wreck. Could any treaty be rendered
irrelevant by private parties' mere lack of compliance with its terms?
Finally, the case raised the issues of what evidence would be required to
prove a "real and substantial connection" with a foreign jurisdiction, and
at what point a wreck can be said to be "embedded."
Similar to provincial claims to objects embedded in provincial
maritime property are the cases dealing with control over natural resources.
In this regard, the federal Parliament's jurisdiction over "Navigation and
Shipping" threatens to encroach upon the important provincial head of
power, "Property and Civil Rights." 3 Hence, there is a distinction between
81 Supra note 39 at 622-36.
82 Supra note 77 at 233-34.
83 Supra note 70, s. 92(13). See generally William Tetley, "A Definition of Canadian Maritime
Law" (1996) 30 U.B.C. L. Rev. 137 at 146, 163.
[VOL. 42, NO. I
2004] Admiralty Law 21
federal jurisdiction and provincial property in Canada. Three rulings of the
Supreme Court of Canada illustrate the uncertainty which this distinction
has caused regarding the respective jurisdiction of the federal government
and the coastal provinces to control the exploration for and exploitation of
natural resources in coastal waters.
In a 1967 ruling, Reference Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British
Columbia,84 the Court held that the coastal waters off British Columbia that
ended at the low-water mark were within federal jurisdiction. As those
waters had not been within the jurisdiction of the colony prior to
Confederation, they fell to federal jurisdiction. The federal government
owned the seabed of the territorial sea off British Columbia under the
peace, order and good government clause of the Constitution because
offshore minerals were "of concern to Canada as a whole and go beyond
local or provincial concern or interest. '85 The federal government therefore
had the right to explore for and exploit resources on the continental shelf.
Subsequently in Reference Re Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of Georgia
and Related Areas,86 the Court decided that the waters between the
mainland of British Columbia and Vancouver Island were within the
jurisdiction of the province, since they had been included in the colony of
British Columbia at the time of its creation and thus formed part of the
province at the time it entered Confederation in 1871.
In Reference Re Newfoundland Continental Shelf,87 the Court
concluded that the right to explore for and exploit minerals on the
continental shelf was within federal jurisdiction under the peace, order and
good government clause in its residual capacity, because Newfoundland
had no jurisdiction over this area at the time it entered Confederation in
1949.88 By contrast, the result in Mar-Dive supports provincial jurisdiction
84 [1967] S.C.R. 792 [Reference Re Offshore Mineral Rights]. See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional
Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at c. 29.3 for a detailed analysis of these cases.
85 Reference Re Offshore Mineral Rights, ibid. at 817. The opening.words of s. 91 of the
Constitution Act, 1867 confer on the federal Parliament the power "to make laws for the peace, order,
and good government of Canada ("p.o.g.g."), in relation to all matters not coming within the classes
of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the provinces.... There are different
branches of the p.o.g.g. power. The Court relied on the "national concern" branch in the 1967 B.C.
case. See Hogg, ibid. at c. 17.1 and c. 17.3(a).
86 [1984] 1 S.C.R. 388.
87 [1984] 1 S.C.R. 86.
88 The analysis that the Court used was similar to that of the "gap" branch of the p.o.g.g. power.
Its function is to fill gaps in the scheme of the distribution of powers. The p.o.g.g. power is "residuary"
in its relationship to the provincial heads of power, because it is expressly confined to "matters not
coming within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the
provinces." See Hogg, supra note 84 at c. 17.2.
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over objects embedded in provincial maritime property and could have
implications for similar provincial claims.
Although there is only one case that sheds light on how Canada
might handle future international disputes concerning wreck and salvage,
Canada has addressed the preservation of historic wreck sites in other ways.
The Fathom Five Marine Park at Tobermory, Ontario, preserves twenty-
two sail and steamships underwater. There have been plans to create a
similar park at Red Bay, Labrador. The site features a sixteenth-century
Basque whaling ship, a wreck of major historical importance. 89 Most
recently, the Parks Canada Agency presented a proposal in 2000 for a
National Marine Conservation Area for Lake Superior, noting the
preservation of shipwrecks as one of the project's goals.9° These efforts on
the part of legislators and archaeologists to promote Canada's underwater
cultural heritage have also heightened public awareness of its educative
value.
III. THE UNESCO CONVENTION
A. Purpose
The Convention9t began as a draft agreement prepared by UNESCO
and DOALOS (Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea), in
consultation with the IMO (International Maritime Organization). There
were four years of negotiations within UNESCO before the final draft was
adopted.92 Parties to the Convention acknowledge "the importance of
underwater cultural heritage as an integral part of the cultural heritage of
humanity and a particularly important element in the history of peoples,
nations, and their relations with each other concerning their common
heritage."93 Great emphasis has been placed on the urgency of adopting an
international instrument designed to protect underwater cultural heritage.
Parties to the Convention express concern that this heritage "is threatened
by unauthorized activities directed at it" and is the subject of "increasing
89 Runyan, supra note 4 at 40.
90 See Parks Canada, online <http://www.pc.gc.ca/progs/amnc-
nmca/proposals/vision/visionbE.asp> (date accessed: 8 January 2004).
91 Supra note 7.
92 A useful commentary on the legal background of the Convention appears in Patrick J. O'Keefe,
Shipwrecked Heritage: A Commentary on the UNESCO Convention on Underwater Cultural Heritage
(Leicester: Institute of Art and Law, 2002) at 14-32.
93 Supra note 7 at Preamble.
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commercial exploitation," realizing that responsibility for its protection
rests with all states.94
The Convention is the first multilateral text on the underwater
cultural heritage, and UNESCO's fourth heritage convention. The other
three heritage conventions are the Convention on the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,95 the Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property,96 and the Convention concerning the
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.97 Within the past
decade, there has been a concerted effort to merge cultural property law
with the law of the sea. Before that, the underwater cultural heritage was
protected by a few general principles and several bilateral and regional
agreements.98 In 1994, however, there were two major accomplishments:
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea99 came into force
and the International Law Association (ILA) adopted the Buenos Aires
Draft Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage."t° A
comprehensive legal framework was further developed as the United
Nations proclaimed 1998 the International Year of the Ocean, during
which UNESCO published the Draft Convention on the Protection of the
Underwater Cultural Heritage.'0 '
In order to understand the full implications of the Convention, it is
helpful to review the key maritime zones affected by it. There are six zones
to which the Convention specifically makes reference: internal waters,
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone, the
94 Ibid.
9514 May 1954, 294 UNTS 215 (entered into force 7 August 1956).
96 14 November 1970, 823 UNTS 231 (entered into force 24 April 1972).
97 16 November 1972, 1037 UNTS 151 (entered into force 17 December 1975).
98 See Craig Forrest, "A New International Regime for the Protection of Underwater Cultural
Heritage" (2002) 51 I.C.L.Q. 511 at 552, n. 188, for examples of these bilateral and regional
agreements.
99United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
62/122 (1982) [UNCLOS I.As O'Keefe explains, the acronym "UNCLOS" originally referred to the United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, but now it is used to refer to the convention itself, for
example in reports by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. See O'Keefe supra note 92 at 3,
n. 4. UNCLOS currently has 143 parties to it.
100 it.A, Report of the Sixty-Sixth Conference 432 (1994).
101 U.N. Doc. CLT- 96/CONF.202/5 (1998) [the initialdraft]. A revised draft was produced after
the first and second meetings of experts in 1998 and 1999: CLT-96/CONF.202/5 Rev. 2 (1999) [the
negotiating draft]. The draft agreed to at the fourth meeting of experts was adopted by the General
Assembly. See supra note 7.
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continental shelf, and the Area. In each of these zones, states have different
rights and obligations. The following are the definitions according to
UNCLOS:
0 2
Internal waters are located on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea (Art.
8(1)). The normal baseline is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale
charts officially recognized by the coastal State (Art. 5).
The territorial sea is the area of sea adjacent to a coastal State over which its sovereignty is
exercised subject to letting foreign ships pass - the right of innocent passage. Every State
has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12
nautical miles from the baseline (Art. 3).
The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. The coastal State may enforce its customs,
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations in this zone (Art. 33).
The Exclusive Economic Zone, or "EEZ," is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial
sea and shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines (Arts. 55 and 57).
The continental shelf of a coastal State encompasses the seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation
of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured
(Art. 76(1)). Where the continental margin extends beyond this 200 mile limit, the shelf
could extend as far as 350 nautical miles (Art. 76(5)).
Area means the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction (Art. 1(1)). The Area and all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ
in the Area or beneath the seabed, including polymetallic nodules, are "common heritage
of mankind" (Art. 136).
The Convention does not specifically mention another maritime
zone, the high seas, but it is nevertheless important. The high seas comprise
all parts of the sea that are not included in the EEZ, the territorial sea or the
internal waters of a state, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic
state (Article 86). Here the freedom of the high seas exists, including the
freedom of navigation. Brice has argued that freedom of navigation
includes the right to conduct salvage operations on the high seas. t"3
102
Supra note 99, Articles 8(1), 5, 3, 33, 55, 57, 76(1), 76(5), 136. For summaries of these
maritime zones, see the UNESCO Information Kit: General Information and Convention Text, 11 June
2002, online: UNESCO <http:/Avww.unesco.org/culture/legalprotectionAvater/images/infkite.pdf> (date
accessed: 8 January 2004) at 13-14 [UNESCO Information Kit]; supra note 92 at 3-4; Tetley, supra note
9 at 634-39.
103 Supra note 9 at 261, n. 11.
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The previous legal regime, as contained in particular in UNCLOS,
failed to provide sufficient protection for underwater cultural heritage. The
two relevant provisions of UNCLOS are Articles 149 and 303. As Nafziger
notes, it was originally the intention that these provisions would broadly
govern the underwater cultural heritage. However, they ultimately became
"the product of political compromise and trade-offs involving more general
concerns among the maritime powers about creeping coastal state
jurisdiction."'O' Article 149 states:
All objects of an archaeological and historical nature found in the Area shall be preserved
or disposed of for the benefit of mankind as a whole, particular regard being paid to the
preferential rights of the State or country of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or the
State of historical and archaeological origin.
One of the problems with this provision is that it lacks a concise definition
of the "objects" to which it refers, other than that the objects must be found
in the Area. Further, this provision implies that these objects must be either
preserved or disposed of, leaving no middle ground.' 5
To make matters more uncertain, there is no ranking provided for
the states that are to have preferential rights. Not only does Article 149 fail
to prioritize the claims of the three states to which it refers - the state or
country of origin, the state of cultural origin, and the state of historical and
archaeological origin - but also it does not provide a procedure to settle
disputes that may arise from the drafters' lack of clarity." 6 An incident in
104 Nafziger, supra note 3 at 319. See also Anastasia Strati, "Deep Seabed Cultural Property and
the Common Heritage of Mankind" (1991) 40 I.C.L.Q. 859 at 865. Strati has summarized these
political problems as follows:
The lengthy negotiations of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS 11) show that the archaeological issue was entangled within the more general
conflict between the interests of the maritime powers, being the main promoters of the
freedom of the high seas, and those of coastal States. Thus, the prima facie non-
controversial issue of underwater cultural heritage acquired a political character since it was
employed as a basis for expanding both coastal jurisdiction over the continental shelf and
the powers of the Authority over the Area for non-resource-related purposes.
Within this context, the drafters of the 1982 Convention adopted a compromise formula,
and one which fails to provide an effective and comprehensive regime of protection of
underwater cultural property. The desire for consensus did not always promote clarity of
the law and the solution provided for in the Convention is far from satisfactory.
105 O'Keefe, supra note 2 at 224.
106 Jean Allain, "Maritime Wrecks: Where the Lex Ferenda of Underwater Cultural Heritage
Collides with the Lex Lata of the Law of the Sea Convention" (1998) 38 Va. J. Int'l L. 747 at 763-64;
M. June Harris, "Who Owns the Pot of Gold at the End of the Rainbow? A Review of the Impact of
Cultural Property on Finders and Salvage Laws" (1997) 14 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 223 at 245.
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the Gulf of Thailand in 1992 illustrated this need for prioritization and a
means of dispute settlement. The Thai Navy seized a hoard of deep-sea
treasure, including more than 2,000 porcelain pots and jars, from a
privately-owned Australian ship that was 65 miles offshore.,0 7 The treasure
had been recovered from a twelfth-century Chinese junk. Divcon
International, the Australian company contracted to carry out the diving,
apparently worked for an Australian-Malaysian consortium that was
planning to sell the artifacts through a London auction house. Divcon
protested that they were in "international waters" and that the Thai
authorities had even given them permission to proceed with the salvage
operation. But Thailand claimed Divcon was acting illegally when it salved
the antiques, as it was within a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone
that Thailand had declared in the Gulf in 1981. Divcon countered the claim
by insisting that archaeological finds were not covered by economic zones.
In the end, the Australian ship was released without any arrests and sailed
on to Singapore without the artifacts, leaving the complexities of the
situation unresolved. The incident highlights the complexities surrounding
the preferential rights of states of cultural origin.
Article 303 is the other provision in UNCLOS that addresses the
cultural heritage. Article 303(1) provides that states have a duty to protect
objects of an archaeological and historical nature found at sea and must co-
operate for that purpose. But there is little else in the provision that would
enable a state to fulfill this duty. Article 303(2) reads as follows:
In order to control traffic in such objects, the coastal State may, in applying article 33,
presume that their removal from the seabed in the zone referred to in that article without
its approval would result in an infringement within its territory or territorial sea of the laws
and regulations referred to in that article.
The zone referred to is the "contiguous zone," defined in Article 33.
The coastal state may exercise the control necessary to "prevent
infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations within its territory or territorial sea," but these matters have no
relationship to removal of archaeological material." 8 The provision appears
to give states control over underwater cultural heritage between twelve and
twenty-four nautical miles from their coastlines. It is uncertain, however,
whether the provision also covers the margin between the contiguous zone
and the seabed that typically lies between twenty-four and two hundred
107 Facts from Teresa Poole, "Thailand's Navy Seizes Sunken Treasure Trove" The Independent
[London] (II February 1992) 11. Brice, supra note 9, alludes to this incident at 267.
108 O'Keefe, supra note 92 at 18.
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nautical miles offshore." 9 This distance can be even greater because of
coastal states' ability to claim an entire continental margin that may extend
as far as 350 nautical miles. Article 303(3) protects the rights of
"identifiable owners," with no explanation of who these might be, and
preserves the law of salvage or other rules of admiralty, in addition to "laws
and practices with respect to cultural exchanges." No state has applied
either Article 149 or Article 303(2), a probable result of the provisions'
ambiguous and unreliable wording.
The Convention, by contrast, is accused of being too inflexible. Not
everyone saw the goal of those working on the drafts as ratification by the
General Assembly. For salvors and those who represent them, the rise of
legal protection for underwater cultural heritage sounded the death knell
for private enterprise and possibly the law of treasure salvage. From 1998
to 2001, four meetings, attended by government delegations and experts
from more than ninety countries, were held in Paris to discuss and modify
the drafts. One staunch critic of the Convention quoted an unnamed fellow-
detractor as observing that
[tlhe invited "experts" are exclusively government bureaucrats or academicians with little
or no diving experience who are collectively and implacably hostile to any role for the
private sector or any other non-governmental underwater exploration. The depth of this
hostility is evident from a reading of the draft Convention.110
U.S. Senators and Congressmen also joined in the fray. In a letter
to then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Senator Jesse Helms wrote:
American salvors believe ... that this convention will pose a formidable threat to America's
maritime salvage industry-and, also, to U.S. admiralty jurisprudence, which, as I am sure
you are aware, has strong roots in the United States Constitution.
... [T]he draft UNESCO convention will, at a single stroke, erase many centuries of workable
maritime salvage law if it enters into force in its current form. In its place, the UNESCO
convention proposes to substitute a government-run system that will crush private incentive
to recover and preserve ocean resources, and may spell the end of serious archaeological
access to underwater sea sites.
109 Nafziger, supra note 3 at 320.
110 Robert D. Peltz, "Salvaging Historic Wrecks" (2000) 25 Tul. Mar. L.J. 1 at 105. David J.
Bederman, another staunch critic of the Convention, provided an alternative to the initial draft by
drafting his own "International Convention on the Exploration and Protection of Submerged Historic
Wrecks," in collaboration with the Professional Shipwreck Explorers Association. See Bederman, "The
UNESCO Draft Convention on Underwater Cultural Heritage: A Critique and Counter-Proposal"
(1999) 30 J. Mar. L. & Com. 331 at 346-53. Bederman has critiqued the provisions of the Convention
in its present form from the perspective of the American salvage industry in "Maritime Preservation
Law: Old Challenges, New Trends" (2002) 8 Widener L. Symp. J. 163 at 192-206.
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... In my mind, this situation underscores the wisdom of our country's decision some years
ago to withdraw from UNESCO. I urge you to join me in an effort to stop UNESCO'S effort
to scuttle an important and workable area of Anglo-American law drawn from centuries of
maritime custom, and to put an entire American industry sector out of business."'
While it appears from these statements that the divide between
admiralty and heritage law can never be crossed, there are ways of
satisfying both sides' interests in the same treasure. By considering how the
Convention's provisions deal with control over shipwrecks, funding, and
public awareness and training, one realizes that not only can the
deficiencies in the Convention help to resolve many problems in the law of
salvage, but also how salvage law can contribute much-needed resources to
the protection of wrecks. It is to the provisions under these three headings
that I now turn.
B. Control
The first criticism concerning the Convention is its apparently all-
inclusive definition of underwater cultural property. Underwater cultural
heritage is defined as "all traces of human existence having a cultural,
historical or archaeological character which have been partially or totally
under water, periodically or continuously, for at least 100 years." Examples
of this heritage include "sites, structures, buildings, artefacts and human
remains, together with their archaeological and natural context; vessels,
aircraft, other vehicles or any part thereof, their cargo or other contents,
together with their archaeological and natural context; and objects of
prehistoric character."' 1 2 One of the Convention's more outspoken critics
wryly suggested that the definition in the negotiating draft, which was
similarly expansive, included "not only historic shipwrecks, but everything
from broken surfboards to yesterday's beer cans thrown over the transoms
of recreational fishing boats."' 3 Despite the all-encompassing appearance
of the definition, at least one omission has been perceived: two experts
III Letter from Jesse Helms, U.S. Senator, to Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Secretary of State (27
June 2000), online: The Institute of Marine Archaeological Conservation
<http://www.imacdigest.com/helmsltr.html> (date accessed: 8 January 2004), cited in Peltz, ibid. at
107.
112 Supra note 7, Article 1(1).
113 Peltz, supra note 110 at 105. Peltz adds that this all-inclusive reach of the Convention, in what
he calls UNESCO's "naked grab for absolute power" (at 111), "clearly goes light years beyond any
purported need to protect archaeologically or historically significant wrecks," maintaining that "its real
motivation is power, control, and money" surreptitiously "expressed in terms of altruistic goals." He
suggests that a more efficacious approach would be to first determine what specifically constitutes a
historically or archaeologically important wreck or artifact (at 109).
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thought that the underwater cultural heritage of indigenous peoples should
be expressly recognized." 4
The period of time during which a shipwreck must be submerged
in order to be considered underwater cultural heritage also caused debate
among the experts modifying the drafts of the Convention. Some experts
preferred one hundred years, while others recommended the adoption of
a fifty-year limit. Still others proposed that 1945 be adopted as the
temporal limit so as to include in the definition of underwater cultural
heritage all objects from the first half of the century having a historical or
archaeological value."1 5 The one hundred-year time period significantly
broadens the scope of wrecks that can be salved by non-governmental
bodies and private individuals.
The provisions likely to receive the most criticism from treasure
seekers are Article 2(7) and Rule 2 of the Annex. Article 2(7) states that
underwater cultural heritage shall not be commercially exploited. Rule 2
of the Annex elaborates this general principle, declaring that "[t]he
commercial exploitation of underwater cultural heritage for trade or
speculation or its irretrievable dispersal is fundamentally incompatible with
the protection and proper management of underwater cultural heritage."
Furthermore, underwater cultural heritage shall not be traded, sold, bought
or bartered as commercial goods. As one commentator points out,
[t]he Convention introduces the idea that the commercial recovery of UCH [underwater
cultural heritage] is incompatible with the preservation of this resource. As such, the
Convention attempts to protect the archaeological value of UCH by eliminating recognition
of any economic value. As a consequence, the place of salvage law as a mechanism for the
realisation of an economic value was a crucial issue during negotiations. " 6
114
See Final Report of the First Meeting of Governmental Experts on the Draft Convention for the
Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, UNESCO 1998, Doc. CLT-98/CONF. 202/7 (June 29-July
2, 1998), at 4 [Final Report of the First Meeting of Governmental Experts]. Indigenous underwater
cultural heritage would include non-human resources, such as palaeontological objects and "natural
features of cultural significance to indigenous peoples that have spiritual associations with the oceans."
See Forrest, supra note 98 at 523, n. 57. See generally Clarine Osgrove and Patrick Walker, "The
Aboriginal Right to Cultural Property" (1995) 29:2 U.B.C. L. Rev. 13, which discusses the role of
fiduciary obligations of governments, constitutionally protected rights, and customary tribal law in
claiming aboriginal cultural property.
115 Final Report of the First Meeting of Governmental Experts, ibid. at 4. Brice, supra note 9 at 271,
points out that it is not practicable to refer to a specific age such as one hundred years because some
newer wrecks rapidly acquire historic value and some older wrecks may be of little interest. For
instance, the Titanic, which sank in 1912 and therefore does not yet qualify as "underwater cultural
heritage" for the purposes of the Convention, has long captured the public's imagination.
116 Forrest, supra note 98 at 533.
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The debate as to whether the law of salvage and the law of finds are
applicable to underwater cultural heritage resulted in Article 4. It states
that any activity relating to underwater cultural heritage to which the
Convention applies shall not be subject to the law of salvage or law of finds,
unless it is authorized by the competent authorities, is in full conformity
with the Convention, and ensures that any recovery of the underwater
cultural heritage achieves its maximum protection117
Despite the Convention's purported regulation of the ownership of
historic wrecks, and in particular all salvage work conducted by states
parties, some believe that this body of law will remain intact:
The law of salvage and finds will nevertheless continue to be important. A redefinition of
this body of law to include shared rules and principles of international law governing
underwater cultural heritage poses no serious threat to responsible salvage or to the normal
practice of salvage law, particularly if the salvage is conducted with the consent of interested
states. Commercial incentives can contribute to a responsible management of historicwreck.
The core principle is simply "preservation for the benefit of humanity.' ' "8
But it is difficult to be so optimistic in view of the fierce debate concerning
the application of these laws. As explained above, the law of salvage applies
generally to vessels in peril, and the law of finds to sunken and abandoned
vessels. In some countries, salvage law no longer applies once a ship has
sunk. In others, the law of finds is not applied to shipwrecks, because a ship
that has been abandoned becomes the property of the Crown. In fact, the
private law concept of abandonment does not exist in the domestic law of
numerous countries, especially those in Latin America. Experts feared that
if no qualifications were put on the application of the law of salvage and
finds, a state that recognizes such laws may seek to apply them
extraterritorially to the underwater cultural heritage of another state with
a different legal regime for wrecks. Archaeologists also found that the
common objective of salvage, namely to rescue only what is of commercial
117 One commentator has argued that there is an implied fourth condition concerning the
applicability of the law of finds: "[P]revious abandonment of ownership is required and never
presumed." See Guido Carducci, "New Developments in the Law of the Sea: The UNESCO Convention
on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage" 96:2 Am. J. Int'l L. 419 at 426. O'Keefe, supra
note 92 at 63, maintains that it is difficult to justify exclusion of the law of finds from the Convention.
Since this law treats the finder as owner with complete control over what has been found, its
application would not ensure protection of the heritage in accordance with the Convention's principles.
But its exclusion "means that an ancient wreck found on the deep seabed, for example, and brought
ashore has no owner unless the State where it comes ashore provides for this. The Underwater
Convention provides no guidance on the basis that it was not a Convention dealing with ownership
issues."
118 James A.R. Nafziger, "The Evolving Role of Admiralty Courts in Litigation Related to
Historic Wreck" (2003) 44 Harv. Int'l L.J. 251 at 269.
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value without regard to the preservation of heritage sites in their entirety,
was incompatible with the Convention's protective regime."1 9 In order to
resolve the problems caused by different legal systems and perspectives, the
requirement that the Convention apply solely to "abandoned" underwater
cultural heritage was eliminated and the question of title was not dealt with
at all. 2° However, all underwater cultural heritage is to be subject to the
protection regime established in the Convention and, consequently, to the
principles embodied in the ICOMOS Charter for the Protection and
Management of the Archaeological Heritage,'12 regardless of ownership.
Some states were concerned that the Convention could undermine
the existing legal order based on UNCLOS, which carefully balances the
interests of states in controlling activities off their own coasts with the
interests of all countries in protecting the freedom to use ocean spaces.
Article 3 attempts to address this concern, stating that the Convention
"shall be interpreted and applied in the context of and in a manner
consistent with international law, including the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea." The Convention further provides that "States
Parties, in the exercise of their sovereignty, have the exclusive right to
regulate and authorize activities directed at underwater cultural heritage
in their internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea."'22 Without
prejudice to other international agreements and rules of international law,
they must require that the Rules of the Annex be applied to activities in
these waters. 23 In accordance with Article 303(2) of UNCLOS, states parties
may regulate and authorize activities directed at underwater cultural
heritage within their contiguous zone and must require that the Rules be
applied in doing so.
24
119 O'Keefe, supra note 92 at 61-62.
120 Final Report of the First Meeting of Governmental Experts, supra note 114 at 5; Forrest, supra
note 98 at 524-25.
121 International Council on Monuments and Sites, Charter on the Protection and Management
of Underwater Cultural Heritage (1996), online: International Council on Monuments and Sites
< http://www.international.icomos.org/underwatere.htm> (date accessed: 8 January 2004) [IcoMos
Charter]. The ICoMos Charter, which as modified provides the basis for the Rules of the Annex, is
intended to provide a standard against which activities are to be measured. Some of its provisions have
attracted criticism from those states with a treasure-seeking lobby. For example, the ICOMOS Charter
emphasizes preservation in situ and further states at Article 3 that "project funding must not require
the sale of underwater cultural heritage," both of which would limit commercial operations.
122 Supra note 7, Article 7(1).
123 Ibid. Article 7(2).
124 Ibid. Article 8.
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Beyond the contiguous zone, however, the proposed extension of
coastal state jurisdiction has been highly controversial. Under UNCLOS, the
rights of coastal states gradually decrease as the distance from the shore
increases. Maritime powers such as the U.S., Russia, and several Western
European countries have traditionally argued in favour of maximum
freedom and minimal jurisdiction in international waters. But the
Convention places an obligation on coastal states to monitor sites up to 200
nautical miles from their coasts. Hoping to resolve this apparent
discrepancy, those modifying the drafts based the jurisdictional structure
of the Convention on the principles of nationality and flag state
jurisdiction. 25 There is both a reporting regime and a protective regime for
underwater cultural heritage in the EEZ, on the continental shelf and in the
Area. The states parties have a general duty to cooperate in the protection
of underwater cultural heritage,'26 and the coastal states and flag states
must work together if these regimes are to succeed.
Any discovery or activity directed at underwater cultural heritage
located in the EEZ or on the continental shelf of a coastal state is subject to
a complex system of reporting, notification, and authorization. States
parties must ensure that their nationals or vessels flying their flag report
any discovery or intention to engage in activities directed at underwater
cultural heritage located in their EEZ or on their continental shelf. 27 When
a state party's national or state vessel discovers underwater cultural
heritage or intends to undertake activities directed at it in or on another
state's EEZ or continental shelf, the state party must ensure that the
national or state vessel notifies it and that the other state receives
notification. The state party itself, or alternatively the national or master
of the vessel, can notify the other state. 28 The state party must then notify
the Director-General of UNESCO of discoveries or activities reported to
it. 29 The Director-General promptly follows up by making this information
available to all states parties. 30 If a state party has a verifiable link,
especially a cultural, historical, or archaeological link, to the underwater
cultural heritage concerned, that state may declare to the state party in
whose EEZ or on whose continental shelf the underwater cultural heritage
125 Forrest, supra note 98 at 543.
126 Supra note 7, Article 2(2).
127 Ibid Article 9(1)(a).
128 Ibid. Article 9(1)(b).
129 Ibid. Article 9(3).
130 Ibid. Article 9(4).
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is located its interest in being consulted on how to ensure the effective
protection of the heritage. 3 t
There is also a protective regime for underwater cultural heritage
in the EEZ and on the continental shelf. The Convention states that "[a]
State Party in whose EEZ or on whose continental shelf underwater cultural
heritage is located has the right to prohibit or authorize any activity
directed at such heritage to prevent interference with its sovereign rights or
jurisdiction as provided by international law, including UNCLOS."' 3 2 Putting
this provision into effect may be problematic, however. The Convention is
only binding upon the nationals and vessels of states that have acceded to
it, and this unilateral jurisdiction could result in a legal impasse:
The question of whether the Unesco Convention does or does not conflict with UNCLOS
remains open to interpretation. What is clear is that countries that have acceded to the
convention could now find themselves in conflict with countries that have not. For example,
let us imagine that a private US vessel were engaged in the recovery of artifacts from a
shipwreck in international waters but within 200 miles of the coast of Italy (which voted in
favour of the convention). Under the terms of the convention, Italy would be obliged to
exert authority over the U.S. vessel, but the U.S. would not recognise Italy's right to do so. '
The coastal state is not granted exclusive jurisdiction, but is
designated as the "coordinating state," organizing the consultations of the
interested parties referred to in Article 9(5).134 The coordinating state is
responsible for implementing measures of protection that have been agreed
upon by the consulting states, issuing all necessary authorizations for such
measures in conformity with the Rules, conducting any necessary
preliminary research on the underwater cultural heritage and issuing
authorizations for activities directed at it. The coordinating state must also
inform the Director-General of UNESCO of the results, who in turn will
make this information available to all states parties.135 However, a coastal
state is granted the right to undertake emergency measures to prevent
"immediate danger" to the underwater cultural heritage belonging to other
flag states, "prior to consultations" with those states if necessary.'36
131 Ibid. Article 9(5).
132 Ibid. Article 10(2).
133 Cristina Ruiz, "Who Owns the Watery Past?" TheArt Newspaper (September 2002), online:
The Art Newspaper < http://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/article.asp?idart=8150> (date accessed:
13 November 2003).
134 Supra note 7, Article 10(3). See generally Forrest, supra note 98 at 543-44, for a discussion
of Article 10.
135 Supra note 7, Article 10(5).
136 Ibid. Article 10(4).
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The responsibilities of states for ships flying their flag that might be
undertaking activities directed at underwater cultural heritage extend
beyond the obligations in Articles 9 and 11. Nations may exercise
jurisdiction over activities taking place even further offshore-that is, on
the high seas, subject to the exclusive authority of no nation, or even on the
continental shelf of another nation-by mandating that a state party
prohibit its own citizens and vessels flying its flag from violating any
provision of the Convention.'37 Article 16 illustrates the problem of control.
Early in the negotiations, one expert voiced the opinion that a system of
protection based on the flag state jurisdiction would most likely not prevent
the looting of underwater cultural heritage from the continental shelves of
third states.' After all, the purpose of the Convention was to create a
practical means of control, rather than putting in place a slow and
bureaucratic system. Whether or not its provisions will actually work, the
Convention's reach from the shore is nevertheless considered to be virtually
unlimited. In fact, the Convention can also apply to each country's
geographical "internal" waters, including its rivers, lakes, wells, moats and
possibly marshes.
t39
Articles 11 and 12 address underwater cultural heritage found in
the Area. The reporting and protective regimes are similar to those
applicable to the continental shelf and EEZ, with one notable exception. A
state party will be appointed as coordinating state, a role that the coastal
state had assumed in the context of the other maritime zones. 40 Article 13
protects the confidentiality of naval operations. It provides that warships
or other government vessels with sovereign immunity that accidentally
come across underwater cultural heritage in the EEZ, on the continental
shelf or in the Area, while on a state-controlled operation, do not have to
report the discovery.4
137 Ibid. Article 16, which reads, "States Parties shall take all practicable measures to ensure that
their nationals and vessels flying their flag do not engage in any activity directed at underwater cultural
heritage in a manner not in conformity with this Convention."
138 Final Report of the First Meeting of Governmental Experts, supra note 114 at 8.
139 Article 28 provides that "[wihen ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this
Convention or at any time thereafter, any State or territory may declare that the Rules shall apply to
inland waters not of a maritime character." See generally Forrest, supra note 98 at 532-33; O'Keefe,
supra note 92 at 144; and Peltz, supra note 110 at 108. Peltz, at 111-12, claims that national laws already
exist to protect wrecks and their cargoes, rendering the Convention redundant and unnecessary.
14 0 Supra note 7, Article 12(2). For a detailed discussion of the regime applicable to underwater
cultural heritage in the Area, see Carducci, supra note 117 at 431-32.
141 Article 13 reads:
Warships and other government ships or military aircraft with sovereign immunity, operated
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Negotiators also battled over the sovereign immunity of state
vessels and warships. The view of many maritime nations is that states do
not abandon their property without an express declaration to that effect.
The United States, for example, has long maintained that title to U.S.
warships is not extinguished by the passage of time, regardless of when and
where they were lost at sea.1 42 But there is no rule of express abandonment
for sunken warships in international law.1 43 When the concept of
abandonment was eliminated from the Convention, difficult questions
regarding sovereign immunity arose. The definition of "State vessels and
aircraft" in Article 1(8) includes warships, but the term itself is not
defined. 4 4 Because Article 3 states that the Convention is to be interpreted
in a manner consistent with UNCLOS, it has been suggested that the
definition of "warship" in Article 29 of UNCLOS can be used.'45 However,
for non-commercial purposes, undertaking their normal mode of operations, and not
engaged in activities directed at underwater cultural heritage, shall not be obliged to report
discoveries of underwater cultural heritage under Articles 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this
Convention. However States Parties shall ensure, by the adoption of appropriate measures
not impairing the operations or operational capabilities of their warships or other
government ships or military aircraft with sovereign immunity operated for non-commercial
purposes, that they comply, as far as is reasonable and practicable, with Articles 9, 10, 11
and 12 of this Convention.
See O'Keefe, supra note 92 at 101-102.
142 The U.S. position was reiterated in the closing hours of Bill Clinton's presidency, in a
statement entitled "President's Statement on United States Policy for the Protection of Sunken
Warships," 37 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 195196 (22 January 2001), reproduced in Jason R. Harris,
"Protecting Sunken Warships as Objects Entitled to Sovereign Immunity" (2002) 33 U. Miami Inter-
Am. L. Rev. 101 at 102-03. Harris notes at 103-04 that the Statement appears to affirm the decision
in Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 221 F.3d 634 (4th Cir. 2000). The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Spain did not abandon, either expressly or by
implication, title to two Spanish warships, La Galga and theJuno, which sank near the coast of Virginia
in 1750 and 1802 respectively. Because the ships had not been abandoned, they were not subject to
salvage. For commentary on the case, see Michael White, "Sunken warships - historic wrecks - title
- abandonment - law of finds - salvage rights: Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or
Vessels" (2001) 95 Am. J. Int'l L. 678.
143 David J. Bederman, "Rethinking the Legal Status of Sunken Warships" (2000) 31 Ocean
Devel. & Int'l L. 97 at 100.
144
"State vessels and aircraft" is defined in the Convention, supra note 7, Article 1(8), as
"warships, and other vessels or aircraft that were owned or operated by a State and used, at the time
of sinking, only for government non-commercial purposes, that are identified as such and that meet
the definition of underwater cultural heritage."
14. O'Keefe, supra note 92 at 46. The three criteria of the definition, which O'Keefe
acknowledges could be problematic, are as follows: the vessel must bear external marks showing its
nationality; the commanding officer must be duly commissioned with his or her name appearing in the
appropriate service list; and the vessel must be manned by a crew under regular armed forces
discipline.
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this definition is intended for modern navies and is not easily applied to
warships that must meet the definition of underwater cultural heritage,
having been partially or totally underwater for at least 100 years.
At first glance, it appears that under generally recognized principles
of international law, there must be special immunity for all warships.
Article 2(8) of the Convention states that consistent with state practice and
international law, including UNCLOS, nothing in the Convention shall be
interpreted as modifying the rules of international law and state practice
pertaining to sovereign immunities, nor any state's rights with respect to its
state vessels and aircraft. The 1910 and 1989 salvage conventions do not
apply to warships. 46 Articles 32, 95 and 96 of UNCLOS provide for the
immunity of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes.'47 Articles 95 and 96, in particular, ensure that on the
high seas these vessels are completely immune from the jurisdiction of non-
flag states. Despite the straightforward appearance of these provisions,
however, it is uncertain whether the UNCLOS regime applies in the context
of a sunken vessel. A number of commentators believe that a sunken vessel
cannot be defined as a warship, because it has been abandoned by its crew
and is no longer in the active military service of the state. Therefore, the
vessel is no longer under the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state. 48 If this
is the case, then warships that are underwater cultural heritage for the
purposes of the Convention may not qualify for sovereign immunity.
The provisions in the Convention regarding warships are further
evidence of the compromise reached between flag states and coastal states.
The coastal state has exclusive jurisdiction over its archipelagic waters and
territorial sea, but the Convention encourages the coastal state to inform
the flag state of its discovery of state vessels "with a view to cooperating on
the best methods of protecting [them]."' 4 9 In respect of the EEZ and the
146 Supra note 12, Article 14, and supra note 13, Article 4.
147 UNCLOS, supra note 99. Article 32, entitled "Immunities of warships and other government
ships operated for non-commercial purposes," ensures that warships are entitled to immunity from
non-flag states, unless the ships have not complied with the laws and regulations of the coastal state
concerning passage through the territorial sea. Article 95 states that "[w]arships on the high seas have
complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any state other than the flag State." Article 96 provides
that "Isihips owned or operated by a State and used only on government non-commercial service shall,
on the high seas, have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State."
148 Forrest, supra note 98 at 527, n. 74 and accompanying text; Harris, supra note 142 at 110-111.
Bederman, supra note 143 at 112-14, rejects the view that sunken warships are insulated from general
principles of salvage law. This view is based on the beliefs that warships should be immune from
salvage as grave sites and that a sovereign can legitimately reject salvage services for its sunken
warships.
149 Supra note 7, Article 7(3).
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continental shelf, the coastal state and the flag state must also work
together, because "no activity directed at state vessels and aircraft shall be
conducted without the agreement of the flag State and the collaboration of
the Coordinating State."'5 ° Beyond the EEZ or the continental shelf,
however, the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state is recognized. Article
12(7) declares that "[n]o State Party shall undertake or authorize activities
directed at State vessels and aircraft in the Area without the consent of the
flag State." Despite the requirement that coastal states notify flag states of
their discoveries, Nafziger notes that flag states still feel powerless as the
"... State vessels ... often contain the remains of military and other
personnel. The Flag States are concerned about their lack of control over
tampering with the bones of their dead and are also concerned with
protecting the technology aboard their military vessels .
While the Convention may not grant states full control over their
sunken warships, it appears to vest complete discretion in the governments
of member states in respect to the disposition of all items defined as
"underwater cultural heritage." Article 30 prevents the intervention of any
other authority by providing that "no reservations" are allowed by its
adopting members.5 2 Article 18 deals with seizure and disposition of
underwater cultural heritage.'53 Articlel8(4), which aims at ensuring that
150 Ibid., Article 10(7).
151
Ruiz, supra note 133. War graves constituted a controversial issue. Many ships have sunk
during battle, and the Convention enshrines the need to respect human remains at these sites (supra
note 7, Article 2(9)). Rule 5 of the Annex ensures that "[a]ctivities directed at underwater cultural
heritage shall avoid the unnecessary disturbance of human remains or venerated sites." Some reasons
for the divisiveness of the issue were expressed in a UNESCO press release:
While many countries, such as the United Kingdom and Germany, protect sunken warships
in which there has been loss of life, other countries claimed that all should be equal before
death. They explained that they were reluctant to distinguish military underwater graves,
objecting to the granting of special status to shipwrecks that carried slave traders and
invading armies.
See UNESCO, Press Release (10 July 2001) online: <http://www.unesco.org/bpi/eng/unescopress/
2001/01-81e.shtml> (date accessed: 14 November 2003).
152 The only exception is Article 29, which allows states with groupings of smaller political units
(e.g. federal states and those with self-governing territories) to make a declaration to the depositary
regarding the areas to which they do not wish the Convention to apply. During the negotiations leading
to Article 29, Canada had proposed a federal clause for the Convention, explaining that certain small
areas of its territorial sea and internal waters remain within provincial jurisdiction. See O'Keefe, supra
note 92 at 145-46.
153 Supra note 7, Article 18. Article 18 reads:
1. Each State Party shall take measures providing for the seizure of underwater cultural
heritage in its territory that has been recovered in a manner not in conformity with this
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seizures are for the public benefit, is of particular interest. Is the "public
benefit" in this paragraph different from the "benefit of mankind" in
Article 149 of UNCLOS? Further, the provision does not provide a way of
prioritizing the cultural, historical and archaeological links which may arise,
similar to the lack of a prioritization scheme in Article 149 for the
preferential rights of the state or country of origin, the state of cultural
origin, or the state of historical and archaeological origin.t 54 Finally, Article
18(4) does not address the difficulties involved in reassembling a dispersed
collection and the extent to which attempts to reassemble such a collection
would-and should, given limited financial resources-reach.
C. Funding
One of the major deficiencies in the legal instruments now in place
is that states do not have the financial resources to safeguard the
underwater cultural heritage. However, the Convention does not sufficiently
address this need either. At an average cost of U.S. $30,000 per day to
salvage an historic wreck, t55 there are concerns that the costs in time,
money and expertise necessary to locate many of the wrecks are beyond the
means and desires of most government agencies:
It is highly unlikely that governments will devote the resources necessary to locate and
salvage historic wrecks, particularly when they might end up having to turn them over to
other governments under the Convention's terms. Thus, what will likely eventually happen
is similar to what has occurred under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act [in the U.S.], in which
Convention.
2. Each State Party shall record, protect and take all reasonable measures to stabilize
underwater cultural heritage seized under this Convention.
3. Each State Party shall notify the Director-General and any other State with a verifiable
link, especially a cultural, historical or archaeological link, to the underwater cultural
heritage concerned of any seizure of underwater cultural heritage that it has made under
this Convention.
4. A State Party which has seized underwater cultural heritage shall ensure that its
disposition be for the public benefit, taking into account the need for conservation and
research; the need for re-assembly of a dispersed collection; the need for public access,
exhibition and education; and the interests of any State with a verifiable link, especially a
cultural, historical or archaeological link, in respect of the underwater cultural heritage
concerned.
154 O'Keefe, supra note 92 at 118-19, suggests that the seized material may have to be split where
the link of the second state is strong.
155 McQuown, supra note 6 at 321, n. 132.
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states have sold permits to salvors in exchange for a "piece of the action," usually amounting
to 25%. "'
Rule 17 of the Annex states that "an adequate funding base shall
be assured in advance of any activity, sufficient to complete all stages of the
project design, including conservation, documentation and curation of
recovered artefacts, and report preparation and dissemination," except in
cases of emergency to protect the underwater cultural heritage. The overall
goal of the Convention is to increase protection on an international level.
It is difficult to imagine how wrecks can be protected at the international
level, however, when budgetary means do not support this protection at the
local level.1 57 Private salvors are required to contribute much-needed funds
to underwater cultural heritage exploration.
The General Principles of the Annex also state that "[u]nderwater
cultural heritage shall not be traded, sold, bought or bartered as
commercial goods."'158 This moratorium on commercial activities means
that the proceeds from such exchanges could never be used as project
funding. This provision will severely limit a salvor's ability to recoup his or
her financial expenditures from the salvage operation. If such financial
rewards are outlawed, the salvor's incentive to discover and recover
historical shipwrecks may also disappear, leaving cultural treasures lost on
the ocean floor. Nevertheless, it has been acknowledged that commercial
incentives have not been completely ruled out. Responsible non-intrusive
access to observe or document in situ underwater cultural heritage is
encouraged,159 and Rule 7 of the Annex confirms that "[p]ublic access to in
situ underwater cultural heritage shall be promoted, except where such
access is incompatible with protection and management." Such commercial
incentives as the sale of television rights or paying school excursions have
been considered acceptable. 160 If salvors can dive onto a wreck for the
purposes of taking pictures and marketing the images, as long as they do
156 Peltz, supra note 110 at 112.
157 One of the advantages of ratification listed in the UNESCO Information Kit, supra note 102 at
11, is the opportunity for states parties to "benefit from UNESCO'S technical assistance, within the limits
of the Organization's budget, for drafting national legislation relating to application of the
Convention."
158 Supra note 7, Annex, Rule 2.
159 Ibid. Article 2(10).
160 Final Report of the First Meeting of Governmental Experts, supra note 114 at 9.
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not disturb the wreck itself, there will still be some financial incentive to
discover these underwater treasures.'
6
'
D. Public Awareness and Training
A final goal of the Convention is to stress the importance of
underwater archaeology for the knowledge of the past. The Convention
emphasizes the "importance of research, information and education" in the
Preamble, further stating that "[e]ach State Party shall take all practicable
measures to raise public awareness regarding the value and significance of
underwater cultural heritage and the importance of protecting it under this
Convention."'62 States must help one another achieve these objectives by
sharing information. '63 The historic and educational value of old shipwrecks
to our national and international cultural heritage has now been
recognized. One author writes that
[t~he story which the salvors and wrecks have to tell is unique in many instances since
shipwrecks are time capsules containing materials from an earlier age frozen in location at
the moment of their sinking. The discovery of an undisturbed wreck, such as the Civil War
ironclad USS Monitor or Henry VIII's flagship the Mary Rose, which sank in 1545 and was
raised in 1982 with over 15,000 artifacts, is comparable to a discovery on land of an
important early frontier settlement frozen in time by a catastrophic natural event such as
a volcanic eruption which buries the site and preserves it.164
Historic shipwrecks can provide information about early ship-building
techniques, trade and navigation. Proponents of the Convention hope that
it will act as a powerful disincentive to salvors and sports divers in order to
161 See Justin S. Stern, "Smart Salvage: Extending Traditional Maritime Law to Include
Intellectual Property Rights in Historic Shipwrecks" (2000) 68 Fordham L. Rev. 2489 at 2526-27.
Stern describes the establishment of exclusive photographic rights to the Titanic.
16 2 Supra note 7, Article 20. Forrest, supra note 98 at 550, notes that during the negotiations, the
term "education" was replaced by "public awareness," the latter being a "less stringent duty on States"
than the requirement to provide formal training connoted by "educating" the public. Article 15 of the
negotiating draft read: "Each State Party shall endeavour by educational means to create and develop
in the public mind a realization of the value of the underwater cultural heritage as well as the threat
to this heritage posed by violations of this Convention and non-compliance with the Rules of the
Annex." During the drafting process, some experts also expressed the view that articles 15 and 16 (in
the initial and negotiating drafts) implicitly made a distinction between education, which refers to
archaeology as a university subject, and training, which is technical training. See FinalReport of the First
Meeting of Governmental Experts, supra note 114 at 12. Inherent in such a distinction is a notion of
intellectual hierarchy. This proved unhelpful in reconciling private salvors, who view themselves as
trained specialists, with the proponents of the Convention, whom the salvors view as officious
interlopers with no practical experience in the field.
163 Supra note 7, Article 19.
164 Runyan, supra note 4 at 33 [footnotes omitted].
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protect the information that wreck sites have to offer. However, there are
also those who believe that such disincentives will severely limit the number
of wrecks discovered.
Some argue that most shipwrecks and their artifacts should not be
given to museums and government archives because these items are by now
redundant and of little historical importance. One supporter of this view
gives the example of shipwrecks found off Florida and the Caribbean:
[F]or artifacts or sites to be construed as being of archaeological importance, they must add
significant previous unknown data to the world body of knowledge pertaining to a given
culture, time frame or technology .... Over the past 30 years hundreds of shipwrecks have
been found off Florida and in the Caribbean. Millions of artifacts have been recovered of
many types of categories. We are now to the point where these types and categories of
artifacts have become extremely redundant, and while many may have significant intrinsic
value and are interesting or beautiful, most have ceased to impart relatively new data.1
65
This is a specious argument because it assumes that items with intrinsic
value or which merely invite curiosity cannot possess an educational
component. Furthermore, if these artifacts are as superfluous as some
salvors claim them to be, it is odd that they are nevertheless continuing to
retrieve them from the depths on a steady basis. The artifacts' intrinsic
value lies in the fact that they are part of the underwater cultural heritage,
the mystique of which is still novel. It has only been in the last two decades
that technology has brought these wrecks to the surface, and their value
and marketability will probably increase in time. If private collectors are
willing to pay thousands and even millions of dollars for such "redundant"
material, then surely there are at least some items in which the general
public would also be interested.
Accompanying this argument that these artifacts lack
archaeological value because they are so similar to one another is the claim
that there are simply too many of them. Private and public collections have
apparently become so large that governments no longer have the ability to
catalogue them, and therefore can only display for the public a small
fraction of the artifacts available. "The staggering amount of material that
has been amassed world wide," insists Peltz, "has led some researchers to
call for a moratorium on excavation .... ,,166 The Convention has responded
to this argument in Article 2(5) and Rule 1 of the Annex, which promote
in situ preservation of sites as the best means of achieving protection of the
cultural heritage. Qualified archaeologists will determine whether the site
would contribute anything new to the body of scientific and cultural
165 Peltz, supra note 110 at 110.
166 Ibid. at 111.
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knowledge already available before excavating it. Prior to any activity, a
project design for the activity will be developed and approved by the
competent authorities.1 67 This procedure could substantially reduce the
number of wreck sites that can be excavated.
Article 21 is particularly important owing to the lack of specialized
archaeologists, technicians, and resources for their training in a number of
developing countries. "States Parties shall cooperate in the provision of
training in underwater archaeology, in techniques for the conservation of
underwater cultural heritage and, on agreed terms, in the transfer of
technology relating to underwater cultural heritage," the Convention states.
The provision does not appear to put all states under the same obligation
to provide training in archaeology. States parties should be in compliance
if they share resources and cooperate, but the extent to which they must do
so is unclear. Article 21 does place an onus on developed states to provide
training and the requisite technology. Will they be able to finance the
training requested of them? Will the training and technology which they
provide be required to meet certain standards? What if one state promotes
underwater archaeological techniques that are considered incompetent by
another? What are the "current professional standards" referred to in Rule
24 of the Annex, in accordance with which conservation shall be carried
out? 168 The transfer of technology will be on terms agreeable to the
transferring state, and some states may be unwilling to transfer certain
types of technology, particularly military technology. 69 Therefore, a
developing state without its own resources to provide training could still be
deprived of the highly technical equipment used by developed states. If
states parties are obligated to cooperate in the provision of training, as
Article 21 suggests, then clear standards should be defined. Admiralty
lawyers are well aware of many of the national standards that are in place
in various countries. Thus, they are in a position to share this knowledge
with cultural heritage experts. By working together, both sides could better
define the terms of Article 21, making it easier for states parties to adhere
to the training standards articulated therein.
The cooperative aspect of training is also of fundamental
importance. It has, in at least one instance, brought together the opposing
16 7 Supra note 7, Annex, Rules 9-16.
168 O'Keefe acknowledges that it will be difficult to establish "current professional standards"
on an international basis, and suggests that "[tihe best approach would be to aim for the most effective
process of conservation available considering the circumstances."See O'Keefe, supra note 92 at 178.
169 Forrest, supra note 98 at 551. For example, Dr. Robert Ballard discovered the Titanic using
remotely operated vehicles funded by the U.S. navy. See Tim Hulse, "Robert Ballard: Explorer of the
drowned world" The Independent [London] (17 September 2000) 28. *
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sides in this debate. One training scheme reportedly turned some former
looters into allies and protectors. The training course for amateurs by the
Nautical Archaeology Society of the United Kingdom focuses on physical
and chemical techniques used in archaeology, as part of the scientific action
of the Commission of Science and Technology of the Council of Europe.70
The interjection of scientific evidence in the debate deflects attention from
what can be seen as the moralistic underpinnings, and therefore less
tangible values, of cultural heritage arguments, persuading salvors to
develop an awareness of conservation in their training. ICOMOS has called
for this type of scientific education to be undertaken at many levels -
resource managers, the public at large, as well as local groups assisting in
protection. 7' Recovery should be attempted only after proper evaluation
of the conservation needs of found items.' Salvors could complement their
vast practical experience with this knowledge of conservation techniques,
enabling them to contribute to designing effective training programs.
Despite the fact that salvors and admiralty lawyers tend to view
inimically the stance of cultural heritage proponents as a moral one, they
could in fact benefit from the ethical codes and duties that the other side
has attempted to formulate. One such code which has governed the
underwater cultural heritage is the ICOMOS Charter.'73 Establishing accepted
practices of professionals in salvage operations can help to deal with
problems raised by the unique nature of cultural heritage issues.174 Salvage
law does not have a code of ethicsperse, but the profession has considered
170 Final Report of the First Meeting of Governmental Experts, supra note 114 at 12.
171 This idea that the conservation of cultural heritage requires public support at the local level
is reflected in Mexico's Declaration of Oaxaca, which adapted the International Charter for the
Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites, 1966. Conservation methodology "should never
be established as an activity lying outside the values, aspirations and practices of communities ... [nor
should it] ignore the very existence of the living heritage of cultural customs and traditions." See
Patrick J. O'Keefe, "Codes of Ethics: Form and Function in Cultural Heritage Management" (1998)
7 Int'l J. Cult. Prop. 32 at 38.
172 Rule 4 of the Annex ensures that "activities directed at underwater cultural heritage use non-
destructive techniques and survey methods in preference to recovery of objects." See supra note 7.
173 Supra note 121.
174 O'Keefe recognizes that the enforcement of such codes is frequently difficult, especially since
there is no clear guide on what the content of a code of ethics should be. Nevertheless, he argues,
"[these codes] serve a valuable role both in educating the members of the various organizations and
the public and in establishing goals for which these professionals aspire." See generally O'Keefe, supra
note 171.
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adopting a much needed archaeological duty of care.'75 The notion that
salvors should act to preserve the archaeological and historical provenance
of a wreck is an emerging doctrine in maritime law. 176 In the United States,
one court has actually referred to this duty as the "Archaeological Duty of
Care," and other courts have imposed similar requirements on salvors.1
77
Yet in the view of critics of the Convention, admiralty law already requires
explorers to act in good faith and perform "good" archaeology on salvage
operations under the jurisdiction of admiralty courts. Such laudable




It may be several years before the Convention enters into force.
With its abundance of treasure salvage cases, many speculate as to what
position the U.S. will take. Although it actively participated in the
negotiations, at the General Conference the American delegation stated
that it could not support the Convention as it now stands.'7 It remains
175 See Clemency Chase Coggins, "A Licit International Traffic in Ancient Art: Let There Be
Light!" (1995) 4 Int'l J. Cult. Prop. 61 at 65. Coggins points out that archaeologists only dig as much
as necessary for scientific research; treasure seekers tend to dig for profitable material without regard
to preserving the site for future generations.
176,"Provenance," which can generally be defined as a place of origin, in the context of cultural
heritage law means the entire history of an object. Provenance is important for two reasons. First, as
O'Keefe explains, it "places an object in context and gives it meaning." Second, if an object lacks
provenance, then the consequences may be legal. O'Keefe provides an example of a person who
purchases such an object: "[The purchaser] cannot be sure of keeping it. There may well be a defect
in the title that means the purchaser will then have to hand the object back to someone with a better
claim or there may be some legislative provision which means that the object can be seized by the
authorities." See Patrick J. O'Keefe, "Provenance and Trade in Cultural Heritage" (1995) U.B.C. L.
Rev. 259 at 261-62.
177 Marex Int' Inc. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 952 F. Supp. 825 (S.D.
Ga. 1997), where the district court held at 829 that courts can impose this duty on salvors operating
on wrecks of historic or archaeological value. For a survey of the other cases, see Christopher R.
Bryant, "The Archaeological Duty of Care: The Legal, Professional, and Cultural Struggle Over
Salvaging Historic Shipwrecks" (2001) 65 Alb. L. Rev. 97 at 138-43. Bryant argues that the
Archaeological Duty of Care would protect historical shipwrecks without abrogating the laws of finds
and salvage in relation to wrecks.
178 Peltz, supra note 110 at 112.
179 The lack of support was due to "serious concerns with certain provisions," such as Articles
9 and 10, which the U.S. alleged create new rights for coastal states in a manner that could alter
uNCLOS. See Sean D. Murphy, "U.S. Concerns Regarding UNESCO Convention on Underwater
Heritage" (2002) 96 Am. J. Int'l L. 468 at 469-70. Because the U.S. is not a member of UNESCO, the
American delegation was not entitled to vote, but the U.S. could still ratify the Convention.
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uncertain whether the Senate will give its consent to the ratification of the
Convention, especially since it has not yet approved UNCLOS.' 8 ° The U.S.
declined to sign UNCLOS because of its deep-seabed mining provisions. 81
The U.S. has indicated, however, that it will generally be guided by UNCLOS
in other respects.12 Like the U.S., the U.K. delegation said that it could not
support the Convention. Canada, an actively involved member of UNESCO,
voted in favour of the Convention and has been discussing the processes of
its ratification and implementation with partners from the Caribbean and
Americas.'83
Because of the potential for infringement on the rights of other
nations and the international community as a whole, exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction must be, above all, reasonable. Underwater
cultural heritage law can work, but its effectiveness depends on the
assistance that admiralty law can offer. 84 The UNESCO Convention presents
a thoughtful theoretical framework from which to address the protection
of historic shipwrecks in international waters. Salvors and admiralty lawyers
bring a wealth of practical experience and substantial financial resources to
learn more about this heritage. The opposing sides in this debate should
view their problems as opportunities for cooperation. That way, they can
each get the best of both worlds and avoid sunken opportunities.
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181 The problems posed by the controversial nature of the part of UNCLOS that deals with deep
seabed mining (Part XI) were addressed through the negotiation of the 1994 agreement relating to
the implementation of Part XI of the Convention. The Agreement, which adopted a modified regime
for those mineral resources found on the seabed in the high seas, still has not been accepted by the
U.S. Online: United Nations <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/
chronologicallists of ratifications.htm> (date accessed: 13 November 2003).
182 See Marshall King, "Admiralty Law: Evolving Legal Treatment of Property Claims to
Shipwrecks in International Waters" (1990) 31 Harv. Int'l L. J. 313 at 317, n. 34 (citing United States
Oceans Policy, Statement by the President, 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 383 (Mar. 10, 1983)).
183 See Canada@UNESCO, online: International Relations and Policy Development
<http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ai-ia/ridp-irpd/07/index_e.cfm> (date accessed: 13 November 2003).
184 King has identified the following international implications that must be taken into account:
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